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EXPLAINING AWAY THE OBVIOUS:
THE INFEASIBILITY OF CHARACTERIZING
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A
NONINDIVIDUAL RIGHT
George A. Mocsary*
Although the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has guaranteed
the right to keep and bear arms for more than 200 years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has never formally declared to whom the right belongs. Each side of
the gun debate—one holding that the Amendment guarantees a right to
individuals, the other that states possess the right—supports its position
with ostensibly solid precedential, historical, and textual arguments. This
Note approaches the issue from the opposite direction, asking how many
precedential, historical, and textual obstacles each side must explain away
and examining the relative strength of those explanations. Under this
analysis, the individual right prevails.
INTRODUCTION
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, “A well
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”1 It is “hardly a
model of clarity,” at least per modern parlance.2 The same can be said of
United States v. Miller,3 the only U.S. Supreme Court case in nearly

* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; M.B.A., University of
Rochester Simon School of Business, 1997. I would like to thank Professor Nicholas J.
Johnson for his invaluable guidance and Don B. Kates, C.B. Kates, David T. Hardy, and
David Karpis for their valuable feedback.
1. U.S. Const. amend. II; 1 Stat. 21 (1789). Scholars often refer to other versions of the
Second Amendment with different comma placement. See, e.g., Adam Freedman, Clause
and Effect, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2007, at D10. The version used in this Note is the one
shown in the Statutes at Large, “the official source for the laws and resolutions passed by
Congress.”
Library
of
Congress,
Statutes
at
Large
Homepage,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsl.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008); see also infra
note 556.
2. Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 Val. U. L. Rev.
107, 115 (1991). See infra Part III for the argument that the Second Amendment was clear
at the founding.
3. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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seventy years that deals directly with the Second Amendment.4 The debate
over the meaning of the Second Amendment has led to the establishment of
two primary schools of thought: the “individual right” model, which holds
that the Amendment guarantees to private citizens the right to own
weapons, and the “collective right” model, which holds that the
Amendment guarantees to state governments the power to arm their
militias.5
The question of which model is “correct” has been contested for decades.
Enough historical material, constitutional text, and case law exists to allow
each side to make a strong argument in its favor;6 however, this Note
analyzes the Second Amendment using the converse approach: it examines
the strength of each model through the lens of the historical, textual, and
precedential evidence against it.
Part I of this Note recounts the Second Amendment’s history, including
its preadoption background, legislative history, and postadoption statutory
and constitutional developments. Part II explores the arguments in support
of the individual and collective right models. Particular attention is paid to
the roughly parallel analytical approaches taken by the circuit courts in
Parker v. District of Columbia,7 Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I),8 and United
States v. Emerson,9 as these are the most recent and thorough cases that
discuss the topic and are likely to shape Second Amendment jurisprudence
in the near future. Part III explores the gun debate in light of both the
recent federal circuit split10 and the efficacy with which each side answers
the other’s strongest positions. Part III concludes that, because the
collective right model is unable to explain away the evidence against it,
while the individual right model effectively accounts for evidence that at

4. See Kevin T. Streit, Can Congress Regulate Firearms?: Printz v. United States and
the Intersection of the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second
Amendment, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 645, 664 (1999) (“Only three decisions since Miller
have touched upon the Second Amendment to any degree, and none directly.”). But cf.
David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme
Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 99 (1999)
(assaying a number of U.S. Supreme Court mentions of the Second Amendment).
5. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007); Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I),
312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218–20 (5th
Cir. 2001); see infra notes 7–9. The models are also referred to as the “standard” and
“states’ right” models, respectively. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218, 220.
6. For example, individual right adherents typically rely on the fact that the
Amendment mentions “people,” while those espousing the collective right view rely on the
presence of “militia” to limit the personal right.
7. 478 F.3d at 395 (adopting the individual right model).
8. 312 F.3d at 1061 (stating, before performing its own analysis, and well before
Parker came down, that “with the sole exception of the Fifth Circuit’s Emerson decision
there exists no thorough judicial examination of the amendment’s meaning” and adopting the
collective right model).
9. 270 F.3d at 264 (adopting the individual right model).
10. See supra notes 7–9; infra notes 162–65.
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first seems to contradict it, the Second Amendment grants an individual
right to bear arms.11
I. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
This part examines the history surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution and the Second Amendment. First, it discusses the relevant
statutory and constitutional background, including the events leading up to
the adoption of the original Constitution, the Second Amendment’s
legislative history, and the presence of arms-bearing provisions in state
constitutions. Next, the Note examines the philosophical background of the
Amendment, starting with American political commentary supporting each
side of the debate, followed by commentary relating to the right to selfdefense and freedom from tyranny.
A. Statutory and Constitutional History
1. The 1788 Constitution and
the Federalist/Anti-Federalist Tug of War
By 1787, it had become clear that the United States’ governing
document, the Articles of Confederation, created an unacceptably weak
central government.12 The absence of a reliable national military left the
new nation vulnerable to foreign invasion and internal “anarchy and
confusion” brought on by rebellion.13 A Constitutional Convention
therefore convened with the initial intent of revising the Articles of
Confederation.14 The convention’s focus soon shifted to replacing the
Articles with a new governing document.15
11. This Note examines the competing models and advocates the individual right model
based on the history and text of the Second Amendment. It does not rely on modern gun
control policy arguments about the costs and benefits of gun ownership because both sides
have an ample set of competing statistics supporting their views, which effectively cancel
each other out. Compare Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce
Murder and Suicide? A Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 649 (2007), and Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 150
(1995), with Stevens H. Clarke, Firearms and Violence: Interpreting the Connection,
Popular Gov’t, Winter 2000, at 3, and Andrew J. McClurg, “Lotts” More Guns and Other
Fallacies Infecting the Gun Control Debate, 11 J. Firearms & Pub. Pol’y 139 (1999).
Further, each case in the circuit split analyzed the issue from the originalist perspective.
Therefore, this Note references modern events and cases only in the context of evaluating the
continued applicability of the original motivations behind the adoption of the Second
Amendment.
12. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 28–29 (2005); Joyce
Lee Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 151
(1994).
13. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (May 30, 1788), in 3 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 31, 31 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
14. Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical
Perspective, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 195, 195–96 (2000); Paul M. Thompson, Is There
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The nation had not forgotten, however, that it waged the American War
for Independence16 in large part because the King of England had kept, “in
times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislatures. He
[had] affected to render the military independent of, and superior to the civil
power.”17 Thus, while the framers sought a stronger national government,
they understood that it was to have “limited and enumerated powers only,
lest the cure be worse than the disease.”18 Indeed, “there was a widespread
fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to [both]
individual liberty and [state sovereignty.]”19 The founders sought a federal
government that had enough direct access to the use of force to defend the
nation,20 but that was also subject to “civilian control” so that tyranny of the
type the colonists endured under the crown would not recur.21
The nation was divided as to the proper balance of power between the
federal and state governments, and the people themselves, and the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention devoted substantial attention to this
issue.22 The Federalists favored more power in the hands of the federal
government, while the Anti-Federalists sought to ensure that the states and
the people retained enough control over the instruments of violence that the
federal government could not become tyrannical.23
The Federalists dominated the convention, and the proposed Constitution
that emerged understandably gave more power to the federal government
than many would have liked.24 These features served as rallying points for
the Anti-Federalists.
First, while the new federal government was supposedly one of limited
powers, the Constitution was so vague that it could be interpreted to
enumerate any powers that Congress “in [its] wisdom or wickedness . . .
think[s] proper to assume.”25 The Anti-Federalists wanted a bill of rights
enumerating fundamental individual rights that could not be infringed by

Anything “Legal” About Extralegal Action? The Debate over Dorr’s Rebellion, 36 New
Eng. L. Rev. 385, 410 (2002).
15. Finkelman, supra note 14, at 196.
16. At the time, the American Revolution was commonly referred to as the “American
War for Independence.” See David C. Williams, The Constitutional Right To
“Conservative” Revolution, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413, 428 (1997). The relevance of
this distinction is made clear in Part III. See infra notes 415–20 and accompanying text.
17. The Declaration of Independence para. 12–13 (U.S. 1776); 1 Stat. 2 (1776).
18. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Finkelman,
supra note 14, at 216.
19. Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990).
20. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government relied on the states to
voluntarily contribute their militias to the defense of the nation. See Malcolm, supra note 12,
at 151.
21. Id.
22. Amar, supra note 12, at 34–38, 40–44.
23. Malcolm, supra note 12, at 151–56.
24. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 237 (5th Cir. 2001).
25. An Old Whig, Indep. Gazetteer (Phila.), Oct. 17, 1787, at 2; see Amar, supra note 12,
at 110 (referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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the federal government,26 much like the Bill of Rights protecting their
English ancestors and former countrymen27 and the bills of rights already
present in most state constitutions.28
Next, the Anti-Federalists took issue with the federal government’s
monopoly on the use of force and its enabling instruments.29 The new
Constitution gave Congress power to “raise and support armies,” “provide
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions,” and “organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]
the militia, and [to] govern[] such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”30 The states were also
forbidden “without the consent of Congress” to “keep troops . . . or engage
in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not
admit of delay.”31
The Anti-Federalists were particularly wary of the provisions authorizing
Congress to exercise control over the arming and management of state
militias.32 They understood the grant of power to Congress over the militia
to be exclusive,33 thus giving it the power effectively to destroy the militia
by failing to arm it,34 disarming it,35 otherwise neglecting it,36 or creating a
select militia.37 They were concerned, of course, that the federal
government could weaken the militia, making it impossible for the states
and their citizens to defend themselves against a federal army.38

26. Malcolm, supra note 12, at 157; see The Origin of the Second Amendment passim
(David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995).
27. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204,
235–39 (1983).
28. Malcolm, supra note 12, at 146–48; Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or
the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 Val.
U. L. Rev. 131, 139, 144, 172 (1991); see infra Part I.A.3.
29. Malcolm, supra note 12, at 154.
30. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 15, 16; 1 Stat. 14 (1787).
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; 1 Stat. 15 (1787).
32. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 136–41.
33. Id. at 155–61. The Federalists maintained that Congress’s power to arm the militias
was concurrent with that of the states, but this was never written into the Constitution as the
Anti-Federalists wanted. Id.
34. Id. at 155–57.
35. See The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 331, 365–66, 401;
Halbrook, supra note 28, at 137–63.
36. See The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 301–02, 401–02.
37. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 141–42, 152–53, 159–60, 174, 183. A select militia is a
military body “not much unlike regular troops,” like our National Guard, specially trained
and armed by the government. Id. at 152; see also The Federalist No. 29, at 180 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to a “select” militia as being considered
dangerous because it is too much like an army of regular troops).
38. See The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 91, 145–46, 192, 224,
354–55. Note the concern with both state and individual freedom.

2118

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Before ratification, the Anti-Federalists wanted the proposed constitution
to address the issues of the lack of a bill of rights, federal control over state
militias, and federal power to maintain a standing army.39 The Federalists,
wanting the document ratified, argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary
because the draft Constitution did not grant the federal government the
power to infringe on fundamental rights, an enumeration of certain rights
may imply a lack of protection for others, and Americans would not allow
their rights to be infringed despite the lack of a bill of rights.40 The
Federalists responded to Anti-Federalists’ concerns about federal tyranny
and oppression, arguing that Congress’s power to arm the militias was
concurrent with that of the states, and that the American population was
armed and could resist a federal army if required.41 Most notably, James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton wrote Federalist papers to this effect:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country . . . be
entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it would not be
going too far to say that the State governments with the people on their
side would be able to repel the danger. . . . To [a federal army] would be
opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands. . . . Besides the advantage of being armed, which the
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the
existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached
and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple
government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military
establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far
as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would
not be able to shake off their yokes.42

Referring to the difficulty of arming a militia composed of the population,
Hamilton wrote,
Little more can reasonably be aimed at with respect to the people at large
than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that
this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice
in the course of a year.43

The debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists continued to be
played out during the adoption of the Second Amendment.

39. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 240 (5th Cir. 2001).
40. See The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, passim.
41. See id. passim. The Federalists also responded that Congress’s power over the
militia obviated the need for a standing army. The Federalist No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 37, at 183; see The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 400–04.
However, as discussed, part of the Anti-Federalists’ concern was this very power over the
militia. See supra text accompanying notes 32–38.
42. The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 295–96.
43. The Federalist No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 180–81.
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2. Legislative History of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment’s legislative history effectively began when
Congress forwarded the proposed Constitution to the states.
The
Pennsylvania ratification convention, at which Federalists outnumbered
Anti-Federalists two to one, ratified the Constitution, but not before the
Anti-Federalist minority proposed an amendment that “no law shall be
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”44 During the
Massachusetts ratification debates, Samuel Adams, an Anti-Federalist who
many believe deserves much of the credit for the Bill of Rights,45 proposed
an amendment that the “Constitution be never construed to authorize
Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable
citizens, from keeping their own arms.”46 New Hampshire ratified the
Constitution, but also proposed twelve amendments, of which one read,
“Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in
actual rebellion.”47 Virginia also ratified, but proposed a number of
amendments, one of which stated that “the people have a right to keep and
bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
state . . . .”48 Patrick Henry, a Virginia delegate and Anti-Federalist who
declined appointment to the U.S. Senate,49 argued during the Virginia
ratification debates that “[t]he great object is, that every man be armed. . . .
When this power is given up to Congress without limitation or bounds, how
will your militia be armed? You trust to chance; for sure I am that nation
which shall trust its liberties in other hands cannot long exist.”50 New York
ratified and proposed a number of amendments, one of which stated that
“the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia,
including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defence of a free state.”51
North Carolina refused to ratify the proposed Constitution until the First
Congress proposed a bill of rights and, in the meantime, demanded the
same amendments as those proposed by Virginia.52 Finally, Rhode Island,

44. Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution 1787–1788, at 422 (John Bach McMaster
& Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Inquirer Printing & Publishing Co. 1888).
45. Kates, supra note 27, at 224.
46. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 147 (quoting The Debates of the Massachusetts
Convention of 1788, at 86–87, 266 (Boston, William White 1856)).
47. Id. at 148 (quoting 1 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 326 (Wash., 1836)).
48. Id. at 161 (quoting 3 Elliot, supra note 47, at 657–59).
49. Finkelman, supra note 14, at 201; Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress: Patrick Henry, http://bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000511
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
50. 3 Elliot, supra note 47, at 386.
51. John-Peter Lund, Do Federal Firearms Laws Violate the Second Amendment by
Disarming the Militia?, 10 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 469, 477 n.40 (2006).
52. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 163; see supra text accompanying note 48.
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the last to ratify, proposed a number of amendments, one of which had a
portion identical to that proposed by New York.53
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, and South
Carolina ratified the Constitution without proposing any changes relevant to
this discussion. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia included with their
ratifications proposals to limit the federal government’s control over
standing armies and militias.54
As the state conventions imply, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
formed a bargain whereby the Constitution would be ratified in exchange
for the adoption of a bill of rights by the new government.55 Madison
almost immediately proposed amendments after the First Congress
convened, which he intended would leave the “structure & stamina of the
Govt. as little touched as possible” and aimed to make explicit that which
was assumed.56
Madison’s original proposal to the House of Representatives of the text
that would become the Second Amendment read, “The right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well
regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person.”57 He proposed that it be inserted into Article I, Section
9, between Clauses 3 and 4.58 Madison’s proposal was altered by a House
53. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 194; see supra text accompanying note 51.
54. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 241–44 (5th Cir. 2001).
55. Kris W. Kobach, May “We the People” Speak?: The Forgotten Role of Constituent
Instructions in Amending the Constitution, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 63 (1999) (noting that
the bargain originated in the Massachusetts ratifying convention, and Massachusetts, New
York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina explicitly mentioned the bargain in their ratification
messages to Congress); see Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets,
1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1105, 1134–35 (mentioning that states had much more influence over
national affairs at the founding).
56. Finkelman, supra note 14, at 213 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 The Papers of James Madison 219, 219 (Charles F. Hobson
et al. eds., 1979)). In other words, the Bill of Rights would not change the allocation of
military power between state and federal governments. Clayton E. Cramer & Don B. Kates,
What (If Any) Arms Does the Second Amendment Guarantee to the General Populace?
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (stating that the Bill
of Rights was not a compromise which renegotiated the military and militia provisions of the
original Constitution).
57. 1 Annals of Cong. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789).
58. Id. Clauses 2 and 3 guard individuals against unjustified writs of habeas corpus,
bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 2–3; 1 Stat. 15 (1787).
James Madison also proposed that what were to become the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and
Ninth Amendments, portions of the Fifth Amendment (double jeopardy, self incrimination,
due process, just compensation), and portions of the Sixth Amendment (speedy public trial,
right to confront witnesses, right to be informed of charges, right to favorable witnesses,
right to counsel) also be inserted there. 1 Annals of Cong. at 451–52. He proposed that the
remainder of the Fifth (grand jury), Sixth (jury trial), and the Seventh Amendments be
inserted into Article III, which deals with the judiciary; that what would become the Tenth
Amendment be inserted as a new article between Articles VI and VII; that the future
Twenty-seventh Amendment limiting congressional pay raises be inserted into Article I,
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committee to read, “A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous
shall be compelled to bear arms.”59 The entire House considered this
version, and Congressman Elbridge Gerry, an Anti-Federalist, future Vice
President under Madison, and member of both the First and Second
Congresses,60 objected to the “religiously scrupulous” clause on the
grounds that Congress may use it as an excuse to disarm anyone it deemed
“religiously scrupulous,” and that “[a] well-regulated militia being the best
security of a free State, admitted an idea that a standing army was a
secondary one,” but the House nonetheless adopted the clause.61 The
congressmen then did not discuss the future Second Amendment for three
days, at which point Congressman Thomas Scott again objected to the
“religiously scrupulous” clause, echoing Congressman Gerry’s concerns
and adding that inclusion of the clause “would lead to the violation of
another article in the constitution, which secures to the people the right of
keeping arms, and in this case recourse must be had to a standing army.”62
After some discussion, the House added the phrase “in person” to the end of
the clause, and then adopted it.63 The House made no other changes before
forwarding the Amendment to the Senate four days later.64

Section 6; and that Article I, Section 10 contain a prohibition that “[n]o State shall violate
the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases.” Id. at 451–53.
59. 1 Annals of Cong. at 778 (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
60. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
Elbridge Gerry,
http://bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000139 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008); Official Website of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, http://www.mass.gov/
(search for “Elbridge Gerry”; then follow first hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
61. 1 Annals of Cong. at 778–80 (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789). Congressman
Aedanus Burke also proposed an amendment reading,
A standing army of regular troops in time of peace is dangerous to public liberty,
and such shall not be raised or kept up in time of peace but from necessity, and for
the security of the people, nor then without the consent of two-thirds of the
members present of both Houses; and in all cases the military shall be subordinate
to the civil authority.
Id. at 780–81 (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789). Ostensibly rejected due to its supermajority
requirement, another likely reason for its rejection was incompatibility with the
Federalist/Anti-Federalist bargain. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56.
62. 1 Annals of Cong. at 796 (proceedings of Aug. 20, 1789).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 796–809 (proceedings of Aug. 20–24, 1789). Emerson states that the
“religiously scrupulous” portion of the version forwarded to the Senate read, “[B]ut no one
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person.” United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 249 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing The Origin of
the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 707). While this is not supported by the House’s
records in the Annals of Congress, it is supported by other House records, The Origin of the
Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 707, and we do know that the Senate considered this
version on the following day. See 1 Annals of Cong. at 796–809 (proceedings of Aug. 20–
24, 1789); 1 Journal of the First Session of the Senate 63–64 (1820) (proceedings of Aug.

2122

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

The Senate conducted its debates on the Amendment in secret, so precise
details are unavailable.65 However, we do know that (1) the Senate
removed the entire religiously scrupulous clause and the phrase “composed
of the body of the people,”66 (2) it replaced “the best” with “necessary to
the,” (3) the Senate rejected a proposal to add the words “for the common
defence” after “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,”67 (4) it
rejected a proposed amendment giving states the power to arm and train
their militias,68 and (5) it rejected a proposed addition to the House’s
language requiring a supermajority to keep a standing army in time of
peace.69 No further action was taken on the future Second Amendment
between the time the Senate sent it back to the House and Congress sent it
to the states.70 The required number of states ratified the Second
Amendment by 1791.71
The Militia Act of 1792, adopted by the Second Congress, which
contained many of the same members as the First Congress, defined
“militia” by declaring,
That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen . . . who is or
shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five
years . . . shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia, by [his
commanding officer, and such] commanding officer . . . shall without
delay notify such citizen of the said enrolment . . . . That every citizen so
enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself

25, 1789) [hereinafter First Senate Journal]. In any case, the change is immaterial to the
analysis presented herein.
65. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 186.
66. Compare First Senate Journal, supra note 64, at 63 (proceedings of Aug. 25, 1789)
(showing the future Second Amendment containing the text in question), with First Senate
Journal, supra note 64, at 71 (proceedings of Sept. 4, 1789) (showing the Amendment with
the text removed).
67. Id. at 77 (proceedings of Sept. 9, 1789).
68. Id. at 75 (proceedings of Sept. 8, 1789). The rejected language read,
That each state, respectively, shall have the power to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or
neglect to provide for the same; that the militia shall not be subject to martial law,
except when in actual service, in time of war, invasion, or rebellion; and when not
in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines,
penalties, and punishments, as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own
state.
Id.
69. Id. at 71 (proceedings of Sept. 4, 1789). The rejected language read,
That standing armies, in time of peace, being dangerous to liberty, should be
avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit;
and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power; that no standing army or regular troops shall be
raised in time of peace, without the consent of two-thirds of the members present
in both Houses; and that no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than the
continuance of the war.
Id.
70. 1 Annals of Cong. 923–48 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of Sept. 10–24,
1789); First Senate Journal, supra note 64, at 88 (proceedings of Sept. 25, 1789).
71. Sol Bloom, History of the Formation of the Union Under the Constitution 62 (1941).
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with a good musket or firelock, [and] not less than twenty-four
cartridges, . . . or with a good rifle, [and] twenty balls suited to the bore of
his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed,
accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service . . . .
....
. . . That out of the militia enrolled, as is herein directed, there shall be
formed [certain units.]72

The current definition of the “militia” reads,
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least
17 [and] . . . under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of
female citizens of the United States who are members of the National
Guard.
....
. . . [T]he organized militia . . . consists of the National Guard and
the Naval Militia; and
. . . the unorganized militia . . . consists of the members of the
militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval
Militia.73

Thus far, this Note has discussed the history surrounding the Federal
Constitution. Also useful to the discussion are the provisions of
ratification-era state constitutions.
3. State Constitutional Guarantees
As many as six states’ constitutions contained or had contained
provisions protecting the right to bear arms when the national Constitution
was ratified, and two other states that did not have constitutions at the time
included such protections upon adopting their first constitutions.74
Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776 stated “[t]hat the people have a right
to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state,”75 and its revised
1790 version declared that “the right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of
themselves and the State, shall not be questioned.”76 Connecticut operated
without a true constitution until 1818;77 however, its first constitution

72. 1 Stat. 271–72 (1792); see also Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The
New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 1139, 1205 n.313 (1996)
(distinguishing militia laws from those requiring militia service and stating that colonial
militia laws required all households, even those without militia-aged men, to have a gun).
73. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
74. See infra notes 75–86.
75. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XIII.
76. Pa. Const. of 1790, art. IX, § 21.
77. Wesley W. Horton, Conn. State Library, Connecticut Constitutional History: 1776–
1988 (1988), http://www.cslib.org/cts4ch.htm#3.
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included a Declaration of Rights ensuring that “[e]very citizen has a right to
bear arms in defense of himself and the State.”78 Massachusetts’s 1780
Constitution declared that “[t]he people have a right to keep and to bear
arms for the common defence.”79 South Carolina’s 1778 Constitution did
not contain a provision relating to arms;80 however, its constitution of two
years earlier referred to the “colonists[’] . . . necessity of taking up arms, to
repel force by force, and to defend themselves and their properties against
New Hampshire’s 1784
lawless invasions and depredations.”81
Constitution stated that “[a]ll men have certain natural, essential, and
inherent rights; among which are . . . defending life and liberty.”82
Virginia’s 1776 Constitution, in a style similar to Madison’s original
proposals for the Second Amendment,83 proclaimed “[t]hat a well-regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defence of a free State.”84 North Carolina’s 1776
Constitution declared “[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms, for the
defence of the State.”85 Rhode Island did not have a constitution until
1842, when it adopted one with a provision that tracked the second half of
the Second Amendment: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed.”86
Also relevant are the ratification-era constitutions of Vermont and
Kentucky, the two states to join the union just after the original thirteen in
1791 and 1792, respectively.87 Vermont’s Constitution of 1786, which the
state maintained as its governing document until 1793, guaranteed “[t]hat
the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of themselves and the
State.”88 Kentucky’s Constitution of 1792, which had been revised since
78. Conn. Const. of 1818, art. I, § 17.
79. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVII. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
interpreted this right as an individual one at least twice in the 1800s, but has most recently
interpreted it as a collective one in 1976. Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment
Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 715, 729 (2005).
80. S.C. Const. of 1778.
81. S.C. Const. of 1776, pmbl.
82. N.H. Const. of 1784, art. I, § II. New Hampshire made this guarantee more explicit
in 1982 when it adopted its current provision reading, “All persons have the right to keep
and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state.” N.H.
Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a.
83. See supra note 59.
84. Va. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 13.
85. N.C. Const. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. XVII.
86. R.I. Const. of 1842, art. I, § 22.
87. Bloom, supra note 71, at 60.
88. Vt. Const. of 1786, ch. I, art. XVIII. The 1793 constitution contained an identical
declaration. Vt. Const. of 1793, ch. I, art. 16. Vermont has a very interesting history: It
declared itself an independent republic in 1777 while being claimed by New York and New
Hampshire, both of which it was fighting. It shared close ties to the colonies, adopting as
one of its mottos Quarta decima stella (Fourteenth star) and sharing the colonies’ connection
to and eventual separation from England. Gordon Dritschilo, When Vt. Hated N.Y. More
Than King George, Rutland Herald, Nov. 5, 2005, at B1; Vt. Dep’t of Libraries, The Great
Seal of Vermont, http://www.libraries.vermont.gov/www/html/emblems/seal.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2008).
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1784 in a total of ten constitutional conventions,89 stated in unequivocal
language that “the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of
themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”90
There are presently forty-four states with arms-bearing guarantees in
their constitutions.91 Of this number, forty-one are decidedly individual
rights,92 two secure individual rights per the most recent precedent on the
topic,93 and one grants a collective right.94
B. Philosophical History
1. Historical Commentary
Many prominent political figures made statements relating to the future
Second Amendment before, during, and after the Constitution and Bill of
Rights were debated and adopted.95 Some of the commentary is best read
in light of the standing army controversy brewing at the time,96 and some as
an autonomous expression of the speaker’s principles.
a. Commentary Relied upon by Both the Individual
and Collective Right Models
George Mason, a Virginia delegate and Anti-Federalist,97 who is often
referred to as the “Father of the Bill of Rights,”98 said during Virginia’s
ratification convention that when Britain decided to “enslav[e] America” its
Parliament was advised to gradually disarm the colonists.99 He went on to

89. Ky. Gov’t, Informational Bulletin No. 137, at 11–12 (rev. 2003).
90. Ky. Const. of 1792, art. XII, § 23.
91. Johnson, supra note 79, at 723–47.
92. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
93. Id. Kansas has conflicting case law and Virginia has conflicting attorney general
opinions as to whether their state constitutions grant an individual right. Id.
94. Id. Massachusetts is the lone holdout. See supra note 79.
95. A representative sample of those statements are listed here. For a surfeit of
additional commentary, see, for example, United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236–59,
265–72 (5th Cir. 2001), and Halbrook, supra note 28. Commentary relating to the standing
army controversy, discussed in Part I.A.1, is not directly included here as both sides of the
debate agree on its details. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 396–97 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); id. at 405–07, 405 n.10, 406 n.12 (Henderson, J., dissenting); Silveira v. Lockyer
(Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1076–86 (9th Cir. 2002); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 237–59, 265–67,
270–72; see also supra Part I.A.1.
96. See supra Part I.A.1.
97. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 136, 153.
98. E.g., Bradley S. Tupi, Religious Freedom and the First Amendment, 45 Duq. L. Rev.
195, 208 (2007).
99. Michele L. Lombardo, Annigje J. Buwalda & Patricia Bast Lyman, Terrorism,
Material Support, the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect
Legitimate Asylum Seekers in a Post-9/11, Post-PATRIOT Act, Post-Real ID Act World, 4
Regent J. Int’l L. 237, 248 (2006) (quoting George Mason, Debates During the
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say, “Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people . . . [b]ut I
cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If [the Constitution]
gets no alteration, the militia of the future day may not consist of all classes,
high and low, and rich and poor.”100 He also said, “[I]n case the general
government should neglect to arm and discipline the militia, there should be
an express declaration that [states might do so]. If the clause stands . . . it
will take from the state legislatures what divine Providence has given to
every individual—the means of self-defence.”101
Richard Henry Lee, an Anti-Federalist and senator from Virginia when
Congress adopted the Bill of Rights,102 wrote,
“A militia . . . are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops
in a great measure unnecessary . . . . [T]he constitution ought to secure a
genuine [militia] and guard against a select militia, by providing that the
militia shall . . . include . . . all men capable of bearing arms; and that all
regulations tending to render this general militia useless and defenseless,
by establishing select corps of militia . . . be avoided. . . . [T]o preserve
liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess
arms . . . .”103

References to the popular character of the militia, self-defense, and the
undesirability of a select militia support the individual right model, while
the references to states arming militias support the collective right model.
b. Commentary Relied upon by the Individual Right Model
Thomas Jefferson stated that “laws that forbid the carrying of arms . . .
disarm only those who are neither inclined nor determined to commit
crimes,” making the innocent defenseless.104 The references to carrying
arms, crime, and self-defense imply a personal right.
Some statements referred directly to individual rights. William Grayson,
Virginia delegate, Anti-Federalist, and senator when Congress adopted the
Bill of Rights,105 wrote to Patrick Henry that “a string of amendments were
presented to the lower House; these altogether respected personal

Constitutional Convention (1787), in 3 Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 380, 425 (1888)).
100. 3 Elliot, supra note 47, at 425–26.
101. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).
102. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: Richard Henry Lee,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000201 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
103. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 152 (second, third, and fifth alterations in original)
(quoting Richard H. Lee, Additional Letters from the Federal Farmer 169 (1788)).
104. Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 77 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1, 47 n.142 (1999) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson, The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson 314 (G. Chinard ed., 1926)).
105. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
William Grayson,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000403 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
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liberty.”106 Joseph Jones, Virginia delegate, wrote to Madison that the Bill
of Rights was “calculated to secure the personal rights of the people.”107
Fisher Ames, Massachusetts delegate, Federalist, and congressman when
the Bill of Rights was adopted,108 referring to the Bill of Rights, wrote that
the right to bear arms is “declared to be inherent in the people.”109 Noah
Webster, a Connecticut citizen and founder of the dictionary bearing his
name,110 wrote in the first major pamphlet supporting the Constitution that
the federal government cannot enforce unjust laws because the “body of the
people are armed.”111
There were also statements indicating that the people at large were the
militia. Tench Coxe, Federalist, Pennsylvania delegate, cabinet member,
and friend of James Madison,112 wrote that the militia consists of “the
effective part of the people at large.”113 He also wrote, in responding to the
“Pennsylvania minority’s” attempt to add its individual right amendment,114
that the militia consists of the people, that Congress has no power to disarm
the militia, and that being armed is “the birthright of an American.”115
Finally, he wrote in a “widely reprinted” piece for the Federal Gazette that
“as the military forces . . . might pervert their power . . . the people are
confirmed by the next article [of amendment] in their right to keep and bear
their private arms.”116 Coxe sent a copy of this article to Madison, who
endorsed Coxe’s statements.117 Webster’s and Coxe’s statements, and
Madison’s endorsement, show that these founders envisioned a popular
106. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 174 (quoting Letter from William Grayson to Patrick
Henry (June 12, 1789), in 3 Patrick Henry 391 (1951)).
107. Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (June 24, 1789), in Creating the Bill of
Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress 253, 253 (Helen E. Veit
et al. eds., 1991).
108. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
Fisher Ames,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000174 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
109. Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (June 12, 1789), in 1 Works of
Fisher Ames 53, 54 (Seth Ames ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854).
110. The Noah Webster House & West Hartford Historical Society,
http://noahwebsterhouse.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
111. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 139–40 (quoting Noah Webster, An Examination of the
Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution 43 (Phila., Prichard & Hall 1787)).
112. Id. at 140; Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: Tench Coxe,
http://bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000842 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
113. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 174 (quoting 13 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution: Commentaries on the Constitution 435 (John Kaminski &
Gaspare Saladino eds., 1981)).
114. See supra text accompanying note 44.
115. Tench Coxe, A Pennsylvanian III, Penn. Gazette (Phila.), Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in
The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 275, 276.
116. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 174 (quoting Federal Gazette (Phila.), June 18, 1789, at
2); see also Malcolm, supra note 12, at 164 (stating that the article was “later reprinted in
New York and Boston”). There is no known instance of anyone disputing Tench Coxe’s
assertion that the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to “private arms.”
Halbrook, supra note 28, at 174 (quoting Federal Gazette (Phila.), supra).
117. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 174–75.
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militia whose members possessed their own arms, with which they could
defend against federal tyranny. In addition, Alexander White, Virginia
delegate, Federalist, and congressman when the Bill of Rights was
adopted,118 confirmed Coxe’s reference to private arms ownership in a
strong reply to the Pennsylvania minority, regarding their objection as
“bordering on the dishonest, for Congress clearly had no power over rights
such as the private bearing of arms.”119
David Ramsay, South Carolina delegate and Federalist, published his
History of the American Revolution in 1789 while he was a member of the
Continental Congress in the 1780s with James Madison.120 He wrote
extensively on the colonists’ history of firearms use, Britain’s attempted
disarming of the colonies, and the colonists’ expertise with firearms leading
to their victory over British forces during the War for Independence.121
Ramsay’s writings bear witness to both the early Americans’ history of
individual arms ownership and the use of those arms by the population as a
defense against tyranny. Echoing the unified defense theme, but adding to
it purely private uses of weapons, Samuel Nasson, Massachusetts delegate
and Anti-Federalist, wrote to Congressman George Thatcher explaining that
the Second Amendment “secured the right to keep arms for Common and
Extraordinary Occations such as to secure ourselves against the wild Beast
and also to amuse us by fowling and for our Defence against a Common
Enemy.”122 An individual conception of the right was expressed by a 1789
newspaper article by Samuel Bryan, author of the Pennsylvania minority
dissent, stating that the proposed Second Amendment “only makes the
observation, ‘that a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, is the best security of a free state;’ it does not ordain, or
constitutionally provide for, the establishment of such a one.”123 Bryan’s
article assumed both a popular militia and an armed population.

118. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
Alexander White,
http://bioguide.Congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000352 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
119. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 150. Alexander White stated that the “rights of bearing
arms for defence, or for killing game—the liberty of fowling, hunting and fishing” are
“clearly out of the power of Congress.” Id. (quoting Winchester Gazette (Va.), Feb. 22,
1788, reprinted in 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Ratification of the Constitution by the States 401, 404 (John Kaminski & Gaspare Saladino
eds., 1988)).
120. Id. at 166.
121. Id. at 166–68.
122. Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), in Creating the Bill
of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress, supra note 107, at
260, 261.
123. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 185 (quoting Centinel, Revived., No. XXIX, Indep.
Gazetteer (Phila.), Sept. 9, 1789, at 2).
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The 1800s also yielded some commentary on the Second Amendment.124
St. George Tucker, a prominent ratification-era statesman and
abolitionist,125 applying Blackstone’s Commentaries to the U.S.
Constitution, said, “[The Second Amendment] may be considered as the
true palladium of liberty. . . . Wherever . . . the right of the people to keep
and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited,
liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.”126
Thomas Cooley, Michigan Supreme Court justice,127 mentioning that the
Second Amendment was based on the English Bill of Rights, stated that
“[i]t might be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the right
to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be
an interpretation not warranted by the intent.”128 However, because the
militia can be defined narrowly or neglected by the federal government,
defeating the Amendment’s purpose of holding the government in check,
“[t]he meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom
the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms; and
they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose.”129 Thus, the
individual right model finds support for its view in ratification-era political
commentary.
c. Commentary Relied upon by the Collective Right Model
The collective right model also finds support in political commentary of
the time. John Adams, the second President, Federalist, and author of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, wrote of
his belief in the need for an individual, but “qualified,” or conditional,
right to keep and bear arms:
“To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual
discretion, except in private self-defence, or by [government order], is
to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that

124. Only those nineteenth-century sources cited in Emerson, Silveira I, and Parker are
outlined here. For a more thorough discussion, see David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment
in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359, and infra notes 143, 159 and
accompanying text.
125. Colonial
Williamsburg,
St.
George
Tucker,
http://www.history.org/Almanack/people/bios/biotuck.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
126. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia 300 (Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (first
ellipsis in original); see also Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary
Right, 104 Yale L.J. 995, 1011 (1995) (reviewing Malcolm, supra note 12) (discussing the
importance William Blackstone attached to the right to arms in his original work).
127. Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, Thomas M. Cooley,
http://www.micourthistory.org/resources/tmcooley.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
128. Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States
of America 271 (1880).
129. Id.
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liberty can be enjoyed by no man; it is a dissolution of the
government.”130

Aside from John Adams’s qualified statement, there is no ratification-era
commentary available indicating that an individual right is not what the
framers envisioned.131
2. Natural Right of Self-Defense
The concept of a right to self-defense to which Mason, Jefferson, and
Adams alluded132 is millennia old, and the ancient writings of such
philosophers as Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle influenced the founders.133 In
52 B.C. the Roman orator Cicero, serving as defense attorney for an
accused murderer, prepared an argument in his client’s defense that stated
that “there exists a law . . . inborn in our hearts . . . which comes to us . . .
from nature itself . . . that, if our lives are endangered by . . . violence . . . a
man who [uses] arms in self-defense is not regard[ed as] having carried
with a homicidal aim.”134
More directly related to our modern form of democracy, Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke both spoke of the right to self-defense. Hobbes wrote in
1651 England that “[a] Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by
force, is always voyd. . . . For man by nature chooseth the . . . danger of
death in resisting . . . than . . . certain and present death in not resisting.”135
Similarly, Locke wrote in his 1690 Second Treatise of Government, that “by
the fundamental law of nature . . . the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him.”136 He
went on to speak of the right to self-defense in a society of laws:

130. Kevin D. Szczepanski, Searching for the Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment,
44 Buff. L. Rev. 197, 212 n.92 (1996) (quoting 6 The Works of John Adams, Second
President of the United States 197 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown 1851)); see Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002)
(leaving off a portion of John Adams’s statement).
131. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
Duke L.J. 1236, 1243 n.19 (1994). “[N]o known writing surviving from the period between
1787 and 1791 states such a thesis.” Id. (quoting Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be
Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right 83 (1984)).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 104, 130.
133. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., The Imperial Presidency 8 (1973) (“[T]he Founding
Fathers were more influenced by Locke than by any other political philosopher.”); Kates,
supra note 27, at 230–35.
134. Gun Control & Gun Rights: A Reader & Guide 113–14 (Andrew J. McClurg, David
B. Kopel & Brannon P. Denning eds., 2002) (quoting Cicero, In Defence of Titus Annius
Milo, in Selected Political Speeches of Cicero 215, 222 (Michael Grant ed. & trans., 1969)).
Ironically, troops loyal to his client’s enemy (the deceased in the case), presumably better
armed than Cicero, intimidated him into silence by surrounding the courtroom in which he
intended to give his speech. Id.
135. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 199 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
136. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 16 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
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[T]he law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose
to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no
reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to
kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to . . .
the decision of the law, for remedy . . . .137

Prominent members of early American society also recognized a natural
right to self-defense. A 1747 sermon in Philadelphia equated the failure to
defend oneself, which it referred to as stemming from nature, with suicide:
“He that suffers his life to be taken from him by one that hath no authority
for that purpose, when he might preserve it by defense, incurs the Guilt of
self murder . . . . Nature itself teaches every creature to defend itself.”138
James Madison, recognizing the existence of “natural right[s],” spoke of
some proposed amendments, such as the right to trial by jury, as stemming
from the social compact, while others, presumably including the Second
Amendment, secured “the pre-existent rights of nature.”139
St. George Tucker, again drawing on Blackstone, informed his readers
that
[t]he right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments
it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest
limits possible. . . . In England, the people have been disarmed, generally,
under the specious pretext of preserving the game . . . though calculated
for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first
view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to
protestants, and the words . . . have been interpreted . . . [s]o that not one
man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to
a penalty.140

In referring to the Second Amendment, William Rawle, U.S. district
attorney, historian, and abolitionist,141 after speaking of the general
desirability of an effective militia, divorced the militia clause from the arms
bearing one: “[A] well regulated militia is necessary to the security of a
free state . . . . The corollary from the first position is, that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”142 He continued, “No
clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to
give to congress a power to disarm the people,” contrasting the United
States with England, where “the right was secured to protestant subjects
only . . . and it is cautiously described to be that of bearing arms for their
defence ‘suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.’”143
137. Id. § 19.
138. Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113 Pub. Interest 40, 41–42 (1993).
139. 1 Annals of Cong. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789).
140. Tucker, supra note 126, at 300.
141. Univ.
of
Penn.,
William
Rawle,
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/features/1700s/people/rawle_wm.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2008).
142. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 121–22
(Phila., H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825).
143. Id. at 122.

2132

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

The English Bill of Rights of 1689, to which Tucker, Rawle, and Cooley
refer and the founders looked for example, contained an individual right to
arms, albeit one limited as described.144 Ratification-era newspapers
echoed these thoughts, referring to Rome’s rendering its conquered people
defenseless.145
Finally, Congressman Egbert Benson specifically referred to the Second
Amendment as ensuring natural rights in Congress when he opposed the
inclusion of Madison’s proposed “religiously scrupulous” exception,146
stating that “no man can claim this indulgence of right. . . . [I]t is no natural
right . . . .”147 Closely related to the natural right of self-defense is the right
and means to protect oneself from tyranny.
3. Safeguard Against Tyranny
Many of the philosophers to whom the founders looked for guidance148
also wrote of the necessity of an armed population to resist tyranny. Plato,
as early as 360 B.C., in The Republic, described the move from democracy
to tyranny.149 Under Plato’s theory, a democracy eventually succumbs to
demagogy, and a would-be tyrant comes to power.150 The tyrant, while still
possessing the population’s trust, disarms it, and then uses violence to keep
it oppressed.151 His student, Aristotle, in The Politics, said, “As of
oligarchy so of tyranny . . . . Both mistrust the people, and therefore
deprive them of their arms.”152
Locke, again in his Second Treatise on Government, wrote that “men can
never be secure from tyranny,” and “have not only a right to get out of it,
but to prevent it.”153 Locke posited that a people may overthrow and
replace their government if it becomes tyrannical or does not follow the
people’s will.154
In addition to the widely expressed general concern about the federal
government’s ability to be tyrannical with a standing army,155 prominent
Americans also spoke directly of Americans raising arms against an
overbearing government. Thomas Jefferson actively approved of the

144. See Kates, supra note 27, at 235–39, 237 n.144. See generally Malcolm, supra note
12 (discussing the English influence on the Second Amendment); supra text accompanying
notes 129, 140, 143.
145. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 165 n.165.
146. See supra text accompanying note 57.
147. 1 Annals of Cong. 780 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789).
148. See supra text accompanying note 133.
149. David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Firearms Possession by “Nonstate Actors”: The Question of Sovereignty, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 373, 377 (2004).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 377–78.
152. Id. at 379 (alteration in original) (quoting Aristotle, The Politics 137 (Stephen
Everson ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1988)).
153. Locke, supra note 136, § 220.
154. Id. §§ 211–212; see id. §§ 199–243.
155. See supra note 95; see also supra Part I.A.1.
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periodic use of arms to keep the government in check: “God forbid we
should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. . . . And what country
can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not warned from time to time, that
this people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. . . .
[L]iberty must be refreshed from time to time.”156 John Adams,157 Thomas
Paine, author of the proindependence pamphlet “Common Sense,”158 and
Justice Joseph Story159 all wrote that tyrants disarm their people before
oppressing them.
It is against this historical backdrop that modern-day Second Amendment
models have developed. Part II of this Note describes the specifics of each
model’s interpretation of this history, along with Second Amendment
precedent and the Amendment’s text.
II. COMPETING SECOND AMENDMENT MODELS
Those adhering to the individual right model maintain that “the Second
Amendment protects a right of individuals to possess arms for private use,”
while collective right model adherents argue that the “Amendment protects
only a right of the various state governments to preserve and arm their
militias.”160 A third model, the “sophisticated collective right” model, is
functionally equivalent to the collective right model,161 and this Note treats
it as such unless stated otherwise.
Up until 2001, every federal circuit court of appeals that ruled on the
issue had adopted the collective right approach.162 This changed in 2001
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in
United States v. Emerson,163 where it directly addressed the issue and
adopted the individual right view. Then in 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in Silveira I, came down squarely on the side of the
collective right view.164 Finally, in March 2007, in Parker v. District of
Columbia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit articulated an
individual right to bear arms in the context of the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban, coming to a conclusion diametrically opposed to that of the
156. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 165–66 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in Thomas Jefferson, On Democracy 31–32 (S. Padover
ed., 1939)).
157. Id. at 164–65. Adams refers to Aristotle in his writing. Id.; see supra text
accompanying note 152.
158. Lombardo, Buwalda & Lyman, supra note 99, at 254.
159. Id. at 255.
160. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
161. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 126, at 1003 (“The sophisticated collective rights
view acknowledges that the Second Amendment was designed to protect individual
ownership of arms, but then argues that this individual guarantee was inextricably linked to
the maintenance of the militia. . . . Because the militia of the whole has essentially
disappeared, then the individual right has ceased to exist.”).
162. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 381; Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1063 &
n.11 (9th Cir. 2002).
163. 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
164. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1087.
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Ninth Circuit.165 This part examines these cases’ arguments in support of
their respective positions.
A. Individual Right Model
Under the individual right model, the Second Amendment protects the
right of individuals, whether engaged in any form of military service or not,
to own firearms that are “suitable as personal, individual weapons”166 and
that are “in common [military] use at the time.” 167 Further, the present-day
absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the Amendment’s preamble
does not render it a “dead letter” because the preamble is a “philosophical
declaration” safeguarding militias and is but one of multiple “civic
purpose[s]” for which the Amendment was enacted.168 Individual right
adherents contend that Second Amendment court rulings, history, and text
support this view.
1. Stare Decisis
United States v. Emerson and Parker v. District of Columbia are the most
recent and in-depth federal circuit court decisions adopting the individual
right approach. In Emerson, the defendant was indicted for possessing a
firearm, contrary to federal law, while under a restraining order prohibiting
certain enumerated acts with respect to his estranged wife.169 Timothy Joe
Emerson challenged the indictment, arguing, inter alia, that the law violated
his Second Amendment right to arms.170 The district court granted
Emerson’s motion to dismiss, and the government appealed.171 The Fifth
Circuit analyzed the Amendment’s precedent, text, and history and held that
it granted an individual right to bear arms, subject to reasonable
restrictions.172 However, the court also held that Emerson presented a
credible threat to his wife and thus fell within a “narrowly tailored specific
exception[]” whereby he could be constitutionally prohibited from being
armed.173
In Parker, six private citizens with no association with a military
organization brought a Second Amendment challenge to the District of
Columbia’s firearm prohibitions.174 Five citizens’ claims were dismissed
due to lack of standing, but one citizen, who applied for and was denied a
165. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395.
166. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260.
167. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)); see id. at
224–26.
168. Parker, 478 F.3d at 378; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 247; see also id. at 243–44, 246–48.
169. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 211.
170. Id. at 212.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 218–61. The court offered an especially robust historical analysis. See the
remainder of Part II.A for the specific arguments raised by the court.
173. Id. at 260–64.
174. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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firearm registration certificate, was held to have standing.175 The court
built on Emerson’s analysis and likewise held that the Second Amendment
granted an individual right to bear arms, again subject to reasonable
restrictions, striking down the challenged law as unconstitutional.176
Prior to United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court had not rendered any
holding with regard to the Second Amendment and the federal
government.177 Consistent with most scholars’ views, pre-Miller decisions
interpreted the founders’ intent to be that the Bill of Rights only restrained
federal action.178 United States v. Cruikshank held that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms “is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.
The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as
has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
Congress.”179 The Court again considered a Second Amendment challenge
to a state law in Presser v. Illinois, where Herman Presser was convicted
under a state law prohibiting groups from drilling or otherwise assembling
militarily without permission from the governor.180 The Presser Court first
stated that “the sections under consideration, which only forbid bodies of
men to associate together as military organizations . . . do not infringe the
right of the people to keep and bear arms.”181 It went on to state that the
Second Amendment applies only to the national government, not the
states.182
While these federal-only limitations of Cruikshank and Presser were not
relevant in either Emerson or Parker because federal statutes were being
challenged,183 Emerson did state that, because those cases were decided
“well before the Supreme Court began the process of incorporating . . .
amendments into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”

175. Id. at 375–76.
176. Id. at 381–401. The court offered an especially robust analysis of precedent and
constitutional text. See the remainder of Part II.A for the specific arguments raised by the
court.
177. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221.
178. Gun Control & Gun Rights: A Reader & Guide, supra note 134, at 157.
179. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). The Supreme Court still has
not incorporated the Second Amendment to the states.
180. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 253 (1886).
181. Id. at 264–65.
182. Id. at 265. The Court continued,
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the
reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States [and] the States
cannot . . . prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the
United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government. But, as
already stated, we think it is clear that the sections under consideration do not have
this effect.
Id. at 265–66.
183. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 407 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting also
that the District of Columbia is a federal enclave, making the incorporation question
irrelevant); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 212–13(5th Cir. 2001).
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their rationales are no longer valid.184 Individual right adherents also note
that the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to compel states
to respect the “great fundamental guarantees” of the first eight
Amendments, including the right to keep and bear arms.185
Dred Scott v. Sanford, reviled for holding that freed slaves were not
citizens,186 based its decision on the ground that citizenship “would give to
persons of the negro race . . . the right . . . to keep and carry arms wherever
they went,” along with other “rights of person,” or “individual rights,” like
freedom of speech and movement, that whites had.187 Congress’s power to
“deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms [is] in express and
positive terms, denied to the General Government.”188 The Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that Congress may not “deny to the people the right to
keep and bear arms” any more than it can deny them any other fundamental
rights.189
In Miller, the Supreme Court’s most recent case directly addressing the
Second Amendment, the defendant challenged his conviction for violating
the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA), which prohibited possession of,
among other weapons, a sawed-off shotgun without first paying a federal
tax.190
The government made two arguments for the NFA’s
constitutionality under the Second Amendment: First, it argued that the
Amendment “gave sanction only to the arming of the people as a body to
defend their rights against tyrannical and unprincipled rulers” and “did not
permit the keeping of arms for purposes of private defense.”191 Thus, the
right was “only one which exists where the arms are borne in the militia or
some other military organization provided for by law and intended for the

184. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221 n.13.
185. Id. at 229 n.27; Van Alstyne, supra note 131, at 1252 (“There was no dissent from
this description . . . .” (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866))).
186. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 395 (1856). This holding has been
overruled by the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
187. Id. at 417, 450, 631–32.
188. Id. at 450. Dred Scott presented a hideous problem for Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
and slavery advocates because they could not accept that blacks would have the same rights
against the federal government as whites. The concept of a collective right was alien to
Taney, so the only way he could deprive blacks of arms (and other rights) was to hold that
they were not people as whites were. If he had considered the Second Amendment a
collective right, this would not have been an issue. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 72, at
1158–59. Abolitionists, starting with the assumption that blacks were people just as whites
were, argued that slavery was unconstitutional for exactly this reason, although in the
converse: it deprived slaves of individual rights, including the right to bear arms, guaranteed
by the Constitution. Because the “right of a man ‘to keep and bear arms,’ is a right palpably
inconsistent with the idea of his being a slave,” slavery is unconstitutional. Id. at 1159 n.87
(internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Dred
Scott, 60 U.S. at 450) (emphasis in Parker omitted); see supra text accompanying notes
187–88.
190. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174–75 (1939).
191. Brief of the United States at 12, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No.
38-696).
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protection of the state.”192 Second, the government argued that “the term
‘arms’ . . . refers only to those weapons which are ordinarily used for
military or public defense purposes and does not relate to those weapons
which are commonly used by criminals.”193
The Court relied on the government’s second argument in holding that
the NFA was constitutional.194 The Court went on to say that the Second
Amendment “must be interpreted and applied” in synergy with “assur[ing]
the continuation and . . . effectiveness” of the militia over which Article I,
Section 8 granted Congress power.195 Finally, the Court, citing ratification
debates, legislative history, and “approved commentators,” defined the term
“militia” as “civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion”: “[T]he Militia
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense. . . . And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men
were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the
kind in common use at the time.”196
The D.C. Circuit interpreted Miller to imply an individual right view by
defining the militia as a popular one.197 In addition, both the Parker and
Emerson courts noted that Miller never refers to the fact that neither
defendant in the case was or would ever be a member of a governmentorganized military unit, implying that lack of such membership was not the
ground for its decision, and thus not a requirement of the Second
The Supreme Court’s having ruled based on the
Amendment.198
government’s secondary weapons-based position bolsters the inference that
a military affiliation is not required.199 The Fifth and D.C. Circuits thus
found that Miller, by examining the connection between the weapon—not
the person—and the militia implicitly adopted the individual right model.200

192. Id. at 15.
193. Id. at 18.
194. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
195. Id.; see supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has also held that
state power over the militia is subordinate to federal power. Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496
U.S. 334, 352–54 (1990) (holding that state militias may be called into federal service over
state objection); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 374–83 (1918) (holding that
Congress has the authority to abolish a state militia by bodily incorporating it into the federal
army); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–33 (1827) (holding that the President has
the power to call the militia from state control into federal service); Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1820) (holding that federal militia legislation preempts state
legislation).
196. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. See id. at 179–82 for material cited by the Court, which
resemble that discussed in Parts I.A and I.B.
197. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–79); see supra text accompanying note 196.
198. Parker, 478 F.3d at 393; United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224 (5th Cir.
2001).
199. Parker, 478 F.3d at 393; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 224; see supra text accompanying
notes 193–94.
200. Parker, 478 F.3d at 394; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 226–27; see infra text accompanying
note 287.

2138

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

The Supreme Court has mentioned the Second Amendment peripherally
in other cases, most of which are not directly relevant to this analysis.201
One, however, is relevant because, as Miller did with “militia,” it defines
the term “people” as used in the Constitution.202 In United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court stated that “people” should be read uniformly
across the Bill of Rights, implying an individual right203:
“[T]he people” seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts
of the Constitution. . . . The Second Amendment protects “the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms,” and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to “the
people.” [This] suggests that “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.204

Both the Parker and Emerson courts found it unlikely that the Supreme
Court would have grouped the Second Amendment together with other
Amendments acknowledged to secure individual rights if the Second
Amendment only protects a collective right.205
2. The Individual Right Model’s View of History
The individual right model maintains that the Second Amendment’s
adoption history shows that people of the time understood it to preserve an
individual right to possess arms.206 The Anti-Federalists, who feared a
strong federal government, were reluctant to endorse the newly proposed
Constitution.207 They wanted the Constitution modified prior to ratification
to include a Bill of Rights, an explicit grant to states of the power to arm
their militias, and a limit on the federal government’s power to maintain a
standing army.208 Because the Constitution could only be ratified in its
existing form, the Federalists, who dominated the Constitutional
Convention, resisted making any changes before ratification.209 They
argued that neither a bill of rights nor a limitation on the federal
government’s military powers were needed.210 Thus, the Fifth Circuit in
Emerson concluded that “[t]he Federalist position as to the militia and
201. See Kopel, supra note 4, passim (arguing that most of these secondary cases declare
or imply an individual right).
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
203. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265 (1990)); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228 (same).
204. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 265.
205. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381–82; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228–29.
206. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236.
207. See supra Part I.A.1.
208. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 240; see supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text.
209. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 237, 240.
210. Id.; see supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
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standing army issues depended upon the people being armed.”211 The
Federalists and Anti-Federalists ultimately struck a bargain whereby the
Constitution would be ratified in its proposed form in exchange for
postadoption amendments.212
The individual right model maintains that the Anti-Federalists feared that
the federal government would use its newly granted power over state
militias to destroy them, making the population defenseless when faced
with the standing army that the new Constitution authorized the federal
government to maintain.213 The First Congress, controlled by Federalists,
passed a series of amendments that sought to give the Anti-Federalists the
bill of rights they asked for while leaving unchanged the balance of military
power between the federal and state governments.214 According to the Fifth
Circuit, Congress and the states enacted the Second Amendment to
guarantee an individual right to arms, which would advance the
effectiveness of state militias in light of the new federal control over
military power.215
The Fifth Circuit reads the Second Amendment’s legislative history to
confirm that it guaranteed an individual right and to validate the AntiFederalists’ fear that the original Constitution left no room for states to arm
their militias. Emerson relies on the initially proposed placement of the
Second Amendment among clauses of the new Constitution protecting
individual rights, along with the placement there of other acknowledged
individual rights guarantees,216 as well as the original wording proposed by
Madison and the changes made to it in the House of Representatives,217 to
show that the Second Amendment applies to individuals.
Scholars agree with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the Senate rejected the
amendment that would have granted to the states the power to arm and train
their militias.218 Individual right proponents argue that not only did
Congress explicitly reject the collective right model, but in doing so, it also
showed that it was serious about maintaining the new Constitution’s
balance of military power, and thus affirmed the Anti-Federalists’ fear of
vulnerability to federal tyranny.219

211. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 240; see supra text accompanying notes 41–42, 109, 113, 115–
16, 119, 121.
212. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
213. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 237–44; see supra text accompanying notes 39, 50, 54, 100,
103.
214. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259; see supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
215. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236–37; see supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text.
216. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 246 & n.54; see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
217. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 246–47. The court did not know what to make of
Congressman Thomas Scott’s statement. Id. at 248; see supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
218. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 249–50, 249 n.57, 255; Halbrook, supra note 28, at 189; see
supra note 68.
219. Halbrook, supra note 28, at 189.
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Given the common understanding of the nature of the militia and the fact
that a select militia was as abhorrent to the Anti-Federalists as a standing
army, and that they would have opposed it as vigorously as the other limits
on state military power, the Fifth Circuit found that the Senate likely
considered the phrase “composed of the body of the people” redundant.220
The House’s approval of the Senate’s version without opposition suggests
that it understood no such limitation, especially in light of the Senate’s
likely rejection of “for the common defence,” so as not to limit the
substantive guarantee to the people of the right to arms.221 Emerson and
scholars agree that the Senate’s replacement of “best” with “necessary to
the” strengthened the philosophical declaration’s support for a militia and
answered Congressman Gerry’s objection to a standing army securing the
nation.222 The Fifth and D.C. Circuits agree that the political dialogue of
the time confirms that the nation believed it was getting an individual
right.223
The D.C. Circuit, following up on Emerson, found that the Second
Amendment protects a preexisting natural right “‘inherited from our
English ancestors’” which was “not created by government, but rather
preserved by it,” as confirmed by its legislative history, language (which
implies that the right predated the Constitution and not that the Constitution
created it), and the Supreme Court.224 It held that the interests thus
protected include the “lawful, private purposes for which people of the time
[own] and [use] arms,” defense against “lawless individuals” and a
It was a “commonplace
tyrannical government, and hunting.225
assumption” that people would use their arms for both private purposes and
any militia service required of them.226 The D.C. Circuit and scholars
maintain that the use of arms for self-defense is intuitive considering that
the country lacked a professional police force at the time.227 Finally, Judge
Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit noted that the fact that a modern state
has technologically advanced weaponry at its disposal is irrelevant under
any normative interpretation because history has shown that individuals

220. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 250–51, 250 n.58; see supra text accompanying notes 66–67,
70.
221. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 251–52; see supra text accompanying notes 67, 70.
222. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 251; 1 Annals of Cong. 780 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)
(proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789); Halbrook, supra note 28, at 190; see infra text
accompanying note 251.
223. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Emerson, 270
F.3d at 251–59; see supra Part I.B.1.
224. Parker, 478 F.3d at 382, 392 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82
(1897)); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 223 n.17, 248 n.55 (citing Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82, and
The Origin of the Second Amendment, supra note 26, at 697); see supra Part I.B.1.
225. Parker, 478 F.3d at 382–83; see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 259–60; supra Part I.B.
226. Parker, 478 F.3d at 383; see supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.2.
227. Parker, 478 F.3d at 383 n.9 (citing Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 646 & n.46 (1989)).
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with private small arms can effectively resist tyranny even today,228 and the
“deterrent effect of a well-armed populace is surely more important than the
probability of overall success in a full-out armed conflict.”229
3. The Amendment’s Structure, Placement, and Text
The D.C. Circuit found that the Second Amendment’s placement within
the Bill of Rights among avowed individual rights further reinforces its
individual nature; it would otherwise be an “inexplicable aberration.”230 Its
originally proposed placement among rights exercised by citizens as
individuals reaffirms this conclusion.231 The Fifth Circuit also noted that
throughout the Constitution, “rights” are always reserved to “people” while
“powers,” but never “rights,” generally belong to governments.232
The courts agree that the civic purpose/philosophical declaration declared
in the Second Amendment’s preamble was not the exclusive reason for its
While the Amendment is unique among its sister
enactment.233
Amendments in that it contains a preamble, its structure was not otherwise
unusual considering the use of preambles in state constitutions and in
ratification conventions.234 In fact, “[t]he recorded debates in the First
Congress do not reference the operative clause, a likely indication that the
drafters took its individual guarantee as rather uncontroversial.”235
Parker notes that the drafters are not likely to have used the language
they did if they intended to protect “‘the right of militiamen to keep and
bear arms,’” rather than the right of “the people.”236 It was “an expression
of the drafters’ view that the people possessed a natural right to keep and
bear arms, and that the preservation of the militia was the right’s most
228. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing examples).
229. Parker, 478 F.3d at 383 n.9.
230. Id. at 383.
231. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 246 (5th Cir. 2001); see supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
232. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228. The Tenth Amendment is the sole place where “powers”
are given to “people,” language likely resulting from a desire to approve quickly an
otherwise acceptable Amendment. U.S. Const. amend X; 1 Stat. 21–2 (1789); see infra text
accompanying note 538; see also Halbrook, supra note 28, at 172, 188.
233. Parker, 478 F.3d at 386, 389; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 233–36, 244–48, 251–52.
234. Parker, 478 F.3d at 389 (“It was quite common for prefatory language to state a
principle of good government that was narrower than the operative language used to achieve
it.” (citing Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793,
801–07 (1998))); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 233–34, 233 n.32. See generally Volokh, supra.
Scholars debate whether the Second Amendment is the only constitutional provision with a
preamble. Compare infra note 323 and accompanying text (noting that the Second
Amendment’s preamble is unique in the Constitution), and infra note 325 (same), with infra
text accompanying note 426 (arguing that another constitutional provision contains prefatory
language), and infra note 430 and accompanying text (referring to the prefatory language in
the Copyright Clause).
235. Parker, 478 F.3d at 391. The operative clause is the portion after the comma. See
U.S. Const. amend. II; 1 Stat. 21 (1789).
236. Id. at 390.

2142

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

salient political benefit—and thus the most appropriate to express in a
political document.”237 The inclusion of the preamble is understandable
given the existing conflict over federal military power, in which the AntiFederalists wanted to ensure the continuing health of state militias.238 The
Federalists, who controlled the First Congress and were not willing to
weaken the federal government which they worked so hard to establish,
“offered the Second Amendment’s preamble to palliate Anti-Federalist
concerns about the continued existence of the popular militia.”239 The
Federalists also relied on the existence of an armed citizenry in attempting
to assuage concerns of oppression by a militarily strong federal
government.240
Parker and Emerson agree that the substantive guarantee is thus broader
than the single civic purpose in the preamble, and the individual right model
provides a reading of the Second Amendment that gives the preamble a
meaning that is in harmony with the substantive guarantee.241 This Note
now examines the individual right model’s interpretation of the
Amendment’s text.
a. Interpreting “Militia”
Parker and Emerson note that Miller, confirming the plethora of
founding-era statements, defined the militia to include “all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defence” who “when called for
service . . . were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by
themselves.”242 This definition shows that the militia included a vast
segment of the population rather than just the subset actively engaged in
military service or part of “select” units.243 Not securing private ownership
of arms would have made it impossible for citizens to appear for duty with
their own arms, effectively destroying the militia.244
The courts also note that the Second Congress, which contained many
members of the First Congress who drafted the Bill of Rights, understood to
what the “militia” of the Second Amendment referred and incorporated this
into the Militia Act of 1792, which defined the militia broadly in
237. Id.; see supra Parts I.B.1–2.
238. Parker, 478 F.3d at 390.
239. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 55–71.
240. Parker, 478 F.3d at 390; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 234–35, 240; see supra text
accompanying notes 41–42, 111, 113–17, 119, 121, 211.
241. Parker, 478 F.3d at 389–90, 399; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 233, 234 & n.33, 236
(“There is no need to torture the meaning of [the Second Amendment’s] substantive
guarantee into [a collective right model] which is so plainly inconsistent with the substantive
guarantee’s text, its placement within the bill of rights and the wording of the other articles
thereof and of the original Constitution as a whole.”).
242. Parker, 478 F.3d at 386 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79
(1939)); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 234 (same); see supra text accompanying notes 50, 100, 103,
113, 115.
243. Parker, 478 F.3d at 394; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 226.
244. Parker, 478 F.3d at 394; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 235.
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accordance with the individual rights view.245
“[T]here was no
organizational condition precedent to the existence of the ‘Militia’ . . .
[which was] the raw material from which an organized fighting force was to
be created.”246 The current congressional definition of the “militia” is
likewise broad, specifically referring to both the “organized militia” and the
“unorganized militia.”247 Finally, the Fifth Circuit also notes that the
Constitution’s text recognizes a difference between the “militia” which has
not been “call[ed] forth” and “the militia . . . in actual service.”248
b. Interpreting “State”
First, Parker and Emerson agree that “State,” as used in the Second
Amendment, more likely refers to a “hypothetical polity” than an actual
state of the union.249 This is supported by the originally proposed use of
“country” instead of “State” in the Amendment’s text, and the lack of
commentary on the change.250
Second, Congressman Gerry, criticizing the use of the word “best” in the
proposed amendment’s language during House debates, showed that he
feared that the existence of a standing army would become acceptable.251
Gerry’s objection assumed that “a free State” refers to the new nation as a
whole, as evidenced by his reference to a standing army: If he thought the
Amendment referred to states’ power over their militias, he would not be
worried about the way in which the federal government could abuse it.252
Consistent with the original reason for adopting a new constitution, it was
the entire nation that a standing army was needed to defend.253
Finally, the use of the indefinite article “a” and the modifier “free” with
the word “State” further supports this understanding. Other portions of the
Constitution use the definite article “the” or the adjective “each” when
referring to members of the union.254
c. Interpreting “Well Regulated”
In accord with the Militia Act of 1792, the D.C. Circuit understands
“well regulated” to mean that citizens included in its definition of the
militia would be enrolled by their state-appointed officers and would be
subject to organization by these officers; the Act assumed that the citizens

245. Parker, 478 F.3d at 387, 394; see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 234 n.33.
246. Parker, 478 F.3d at 387–88.
247. Id. at 388 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000)); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 234 n.33 (same).
248. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; U.S. Const. amend. V; 1 Stat. 14 (1787); 1 Stat. 21
(1789); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228.
249. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396; see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 235.
250. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396; see supra text accompanying notes 57, 59.
251. See supra text accompanying note 61.
252. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 247–48; see Parker, 478 F.3d at 396.
253. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396; see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 247–48.
254. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396.
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would supply their own arms, not be armed by their states.255 State
armament would mean that the militia was a select one, unacceptable to
Anti-Federalists,256 rather than the popular militia defined in the Act.257
The Fifth Circuit interprets the frequent founding-era references to a
“well regulated militia” consisting of “the body of the people” and similar
language to show that the phrase “well regulated” intended to state that
discipline and training is necessary for the militia to function effectively,
rather than to limit its scope to a subset of the population.258 Thus,
reasonable restrictions, like limiting firearm access to criminals and the
insane, may be consistent with a “well regulated Militia.”259
d. Interpreting “People”
The individual right model assigns the same everyday meaning to
“people” that common parlance and the other contemporaneously ratified
Amendments of the Bill of Rights do, as the Supreme Court declared in
Verdugo-Urquidez.260 Parker and Emerson agree that it has never been
doubted that the term as used in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments protects individual interests from governmental
encroachment.261
The founders also took care, both in the Bill of Rights and the original
Constitution, to refer to “people” when they meant individuals and “states”
when they meant a political entity; “people” has never been used to refer to
either a subset of the people, like a select militia, or to the states.262
Further, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
corrected any shortcomings with respect to the consideration of nonwhites
and others as “people.”263
Individual right adherents also maintain that construing “people” to mean
“states” or “select militia,” is also in conflict with Article I, Section 8,
Clause 16 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to arm
militias.264 Reading the Second Amendment as granting militia-arming
power to states would mean that it repealed or modified Article I, Section 8,

255. Id. at 388–89 (citing 1 Stat. 271 (1792)).
256. See supra notes 37, 103 and accompanying text.
257. Parker, 478 F.3d at 388 (citing the Militia Act’s directive that “out of the militia”
units must be formed); see supra text accompanying note 72.
258. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 234–36, 234 n.34, 235 nn.36–37; see supra text accompanying
notes 48–53, 59, 84, 123.
259. Parker, 478 F.3d at 399; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227 n.21, 261.
260. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265 (1990)); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227–28 (same); see supra text accompanying notes 202–
05.
261. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227–28.
262. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381–82; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228–29.
263. Parker, 478 F.3d at 382.
264. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; 1 Stat. 14 (1787); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227.
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Clause 16.265 However, there is no record of anyone considering this, and
such a concept would conflict with the intent of the framers that the Bill of
Rights leave the powers allocated by the Constitution untouched.266 Thus,
the right guaranteed must be individual.267
e. Interpreting “Bear”
The Parker and Emerson courts found that while the phrase “bear arms”
can have a military connotation, this is not the only sense in which it can
validly be used.268 At the founding, the word “bear” was a synonym for
“carry,” and the idiomatic military usage of “bear arms” related only to a
secondary meaning.269
Both circuits also found the abundant use of the phrase “bear arms” in
state constitutional provisions and ratification-era discourse manifestly
guaranteeing an individual right to support the view that a military reading
is not the only valid one.270 That the Tennessee Supreme Court held in
1840 that “bear” had only a military meaning is of no moment because the
Tennessee Constitution that it interpreted contained language qualifying its
right to bear arms as being “for their common defense.”271
The D.C. and Fifth Circuits also found it compelling that four members
of the Supreme Court recognized the primary meaning of “bear” (“to
carry”) in the phrase “bear arms”:
“a most familiar meaning [of carrying a firearm] is, as the Constitution’s
Second Amendment (‘keep and bear Arms’) . . . indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear,
or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the
purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in
a case of conflict with another person.” [Thus], the operative clause
includes a private meaning for “bear Arms.”272

265. Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States’ Rights:
A Thought Experiment, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1737, 1743–49 (1995).
266. Id.; see supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 195.
267. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229; see Reynolds & Kates, supra note 265.
268. Parker, 478 F.3d at 384; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229–31. Madison’s original
conscientious objector clause did use the phrase in the military sense. See supra text
accompanying note 58; see also infra Part II.B.3.e.
269. Parker, 478 F.3d at 384 (citing Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 573
(9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)); Emerson, 270
F.3d at 229–32.
270. Parker, 478 F.3d at 384; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 230–32, 230 n.29; see supra Parts
I.A.3, I.B.1.b.
271. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229–30 (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154
(1840)); see infra text accompanying notes 340–41.
272. Parker, 478 F.3d at 385 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Souter, JJ.)); Emerson,
270 F.3d at 232 (same).
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f. Interpreting “Keep”
Parker held that the word “keep” must be given “independent
significance.”273 Dictionaries of the time confirm that the word “keep”
then, as now, has the common meaning relating to possession, and its use in
the Second Amendment thus implies “ownership or possession of a
functioning weapon by an individual for private use.”274 The Tennessee
Supreme Court also construed “keep” and “bear” independently in Aymette
v. State, holding that “citizens have the unqualified right to keep the
weapon . . . [b]ut the right to bear arms is not of that unqualified
character.”275
g. Interpreting “Arms”
Miller confirms that the framers envisioned a militia composed of
“civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion,” who, when called for service,
“were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the
kind in common use at the time.”276 Parker and Emerson held that the arms
protected, in accord with the Amendment’s civic purpose, are those suitable
for individual military use, not weapons of mass destruction or those
commonly used only by criminals.277 Handguns and long guns are
common military arms bearing a reasonable relationship to the efficiency of
a well-regulated militia, and they are in “common use” today.278
B. Collective Right Model
Under the collective right model, “federal and state governments have the
full authority to enact prohibitions and restrictions on the use and
possession of firearms.”279 The “militia” clause of the Amendment limits
any substantive right guaranteed to the context of state military service,
making the conclusion that an individual right was guaranteed
unjustifiable.280 The model’s adherents contend that Second Amendment
court rulings, history, and text support this view.281

273. Parker, 478 F.3d at 385–86.
274. Id. (citing Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 573–74 (2003) (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 232 & n.31).
275. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 232 n.31 (citing Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 154) (emphasis
in Emerson).
276. Parker, 478 F.3d at 394 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939))
(emphasis in Parker).
277. Id. at 395; see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 222, 260.
278. Parker, 478 F.3d at 398; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260 (noting that the arms must be in
accord with the types specified by Miller).
279. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
280. Id. at 1075.
281. Id. at 1060–87.
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1. Stare Decisis
Silveira I is the most recent and in-depth federal circuit court decision
adopting the collective right approach. In that case, nine plaintiffs
challenged California’s 1999 assault weapons ban on, inter alia, Second
Amendment grounds.282
After performing an analysis similar to
Emerson’s, the court reached the opposite conclusion: the Second
Amendment grants a collective, as opposed to an individual, right to bear
arms.283 Because plaintiffs were individuals, the court held that they lacked
standing to bring a Second Amendment claim and upheld the district court’s
dismissal of their suit.284
The Ninth Circuit agrees that “Cruikshank and Presser rest on a principle
that is now thoroughly discredited.”285 However, in finding a collective
right, the court found it unnecessary to address the incorporation issue.286
Silveira I further found that Miller’s holding that the Second Amendment
does not guarantee the right to keep and bear a sawed-off shotgun because
“it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense”
strongly implies a nonindividual right.287 This interpretation, combined
with the lopsided way in which other circuit courts have ruled, shows that
“‘the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual
right.’”288 “[A] weapons-based theory of the amendment” that permits
possession of any weapon having a “‘legitimate use in the hands of private
individuals,’”289 “regardless of the relationship of the individual or the
weapon to militia service,” is incompatible with Miller.290 The Ninth
Circuit also cites Verdugo-Urquidez in support of its position that “militia”
be read consistently throughout the Constitution,291 as well as with other
Supreme Court cases with peripheral Second Amendment mentions.292
Unlike federal appellate courts,293 state appellate courts are rather evenly
split on their interpretations of the Second Amendment of the Federal

282. Id. at 1059.
283. Id. at 1060–87, 1092–93. See the remainder of Part II.B for the specific arguments
raised by the court.
284. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1087.
285. Id. at 1067 n.17; see supra text accompanying notes 177–84. But see Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 407 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Second Amendment has not been incorporated to the states).
286. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1066 n.17.
287. Id. at 1061 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
288. Id. at 1063 (quoting Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996)); see supra
notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
289. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1060 n.8 (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 223
(5th Cir. 2001)).
290. Id. at 1064 n.13.
291. Id. at 1069–70, 1070 n.25; cf. supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
292. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1061–63. But see Kopel, supra note 4, passim (arguing that
most secondary Supreme Court cases declare or imply an individual right).
293. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
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Constitution.294 Further, state court decisions relating to a right to bear
arms tend to focus on their respective states’ constitutions’ arms
guarantees.295 However, two state cases, State v. Buzzard and City of
Salina v. Blaksley, are worth examining.296
In 1842, the majority in Buzzard, interpreting both the Second
Amendment and the Arkansas Constitution, upheld a ban on carrying
concealed weapons, reasoning that the law did not interfere with the
people’s ability, via their militias, to secure the “public liberty and the free
institutions of the state.”297 A concurring opinion went farther than the
majority, however, stating that “[t]he provision of the Federal
constitution . . . is but an assertion of that general right of sovereignty
belonging to independent nations, to regulate their military force.”298 This
concurring opinion was the first reference to a nonindividual interpretation
of the Second Amendment.299
Some sixty years later, Blaksley became the first holding by a court to
adopt the collective right view, though only with reference to the Kansas
Constitution: “The provision [of the Kansas Constitution] ‘that the people
have the right to bear arms . . .’ refers to the people as a collective body.”300
Not only do collective right advocates maintain that longstanding precedent
supports their view, but they hold that it also accords with history.
2. The Collective Right Model’s View of History
The collective right model agrees with the individual model that the
Second Amendment was enacted in order to allay Anti-Federalists’ fears
that the federal government would destroy the states’ militias, setting the
stage for tyranny.301 However, it maintains that the Amendment’s only
purpose was to protect the people from the federal government via their
militias: “The amendment protects the people’s right to maintain an
effective state militia, and does not establish an individual right to own or
possess firearms for personal or other use.”302
Under the Articles of Confederation, the responsibility of providing and
arming the forces to defend the nation belonged to the states, not to
294. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (compiling
state appellate court decisions).
295. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
296. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan.
1905).
297. Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 19–25 (reasoning that all natural rights not explicitly retained by
citizens are surrendered to the government, that an absolute right to arms would allow even
criminals to be armed, and that, because such an absolute right is unacceptable, there is no
right outside the militia context).
298. Id. at 32 (Dickinson, J., concurring).
299. See Kopel, supra note 124, at 1422–24.
300. Blaksley, 83 P. at 620; see Kopel, supra note 124, at 1510–12.
301. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra text
accompanying notes 32–38, 213.
302. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1066.
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Congress or the militiamen.303 Silveira I argues that the Constitutional
Convention was convened primarily to address the need for a national
army, as confirmed by the amount of time spent by the delegates debating
the federal/state balance of military power.304 All agreed that effective
militias were crucial, and the “compromise” ultimately reached
“prevent[ed]” the phenomenon of “large standing armies” by strengthening
the militias through granting Congress responsibility for their management
(arming, organizing, and disciplining) while ensuring that they remained
essentially state military entities (states appointed officers and trained the
militia according to “Congressional dictates”).305
The provision granting Congress the power to arm the militias troubled
the Anti-Federalists most, the disagreement being whether that power
should be exclusive or concurrent with a state power to provide such
arms.306 Despite the compromise reached during the convention, Federalist
assurances to the contrary,307 and the fact that “[t]he text of Article I” says
that “Congress ‘may’ arm the militia,” and is thus nonexclusive, the AntiFederalists still feared a congressional monopoly on military power.308
This fear remained their primary objection to the ratification of the new
Constitution.309 In addition, the Ninth Circuit contends that preserving the
states’ militia-arming right in the face of the federal government’s
“dominant control over the national defense” was the sole reason that the
Second Amendment became part of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist
bargain.310
The Silveira I court asserted that the founders’ statements also implied
that they contemplated a state military power rather than an individual right.
Madison’s references to militias and states in Federalist No. 46 show that
he was referring to a collective right.311 Statements by, among others,
Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Richard Henry Lee about the exclusivity
or concurrence of the power to arm militias also support the collective right
view.312 In fact, although George Mason and Richard Henry Lee published
objections to the new Constitution, they never advocated a “purely private
right to arms.”313 Thomas Jefferson’s failure to suggest an individual right
to arms in a letter about the Bill of Rights to Madison also implies a
303. Id. at 1077; see supra note 20.
304. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1077–78; see supra Parts I.A.1–2.
305. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1078–79; see supra text accompanying note 30. But see supra
text accompanying notes 31–38, 41.
306. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1079–81; see supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
308. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1080–81, 1081 n.43; see supra text accompanying note 32.
309. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1080–81.
310. Id. at 1077–78, 1086.
311. Id. at 1079; see supra note 42.
312. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1080–83, 1082 n.45; see supra text accompanying notes 49–
50, 97–103.
313. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1082 n.45 (citing H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel,
The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 403, 411–13 (2000)).
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collective right.314 “The Anti-Federalists viewed the state militias as
providing the only true opportunity for the people to bear arms.”315
Furthermore, Federalist John Adams’s statement about “arms in the hands
of citizens” not only implies a collective right, but “ridicule[s] the concept
of [an individual right].”316
Silveira I also finds support in the Second Amendment’s congressional
legislative history, which shows “that the amendment was designed to
ensure that the people retained the right to maintain effective state militias,
the members of which could be armed by the states as well as by the federal
government.”317 The court went on to declare that “not a single statement
in the Congressional debate about the proposed amendment . . . indicates
that any Congressman contemplated that it would establish an individual
right to possess a weapon.”318
Similarly, the original Constitution’s ratification debates in New York,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, whose proposed amendments were
worded similarly to the Second Amendment in its final form, were “almost
entirely—but not completely—devoid of any mention of an individual
right.”319 In fact, “[n]one of the major proposals for a Bill of Rights
included any provision affording individuals such a right.”320 “[O]nly a
few isolated voices” advocated an individual right, and only New
Hampshire’s ratifying convention proposed an amendment explicitly
establishing an individual right to arms.321 The argument follows that
because New Hampshire’s wording was so different from that of other
states’ arms-related proposals, the other states must have proposed a
collective right.322
3. The Amendment’s Structure, Placement, and Text
The Ninth Circuit found the Second Amendment “particularly striking”
because it contains a prefatory clause, unique in the Constitution, that must
be a part of its interpretation.323 “[T]he first clause does more than simply
state the amendment’s purpose or justification: it also helps shape and
define the meaning of the substantive provision contained in the second
clause,” and “[i]t must be interpreted . . . with that end in view.”324 To do
otherwise would be to “read the first clause out of the amendment
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1081.
316. Id. at 1085; see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
317. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1085; see supra notes 56–71 and accompanying text.
318. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1085.
319. Id. at 1081–82; see supra text accompanying notes 44–54.
320. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1082 n.45.
321. Id. at 1083; see supra text accompanying note 47.
322. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1083.
323. Id. at 1068–69, 1068 n.23 (claiming also that the Copyright and Patent Clause does
not have a preamble).
324. Id. at 1075 & n.33 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))
(emphasis in Silveira I).
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altogether.”325 Proponents of the collective right model hold that the most
plausible interpretation of the Amendment is that it sought to safeguard
state militias from federal interference, and nothing more.326
According to the Ninth Circuit, the fact that every other Bill of Rights
Amendment establishes individual rights is immaterial because certain
portions of the adopted Amendments refer to other matters.327 Moreover,
the recently adopted Twenty-seventh Amendment was also among the
proposals made to the states, and it did not protect individual rights.328
a. Interpreting “Militia”
In addition to its structural arguments, this model also maintains that the
Second Amendment’s text implies a collective right, as set forth below.
The collective right model argues that, based on ordinary meaning and its
usage in other portions of the Constitution, “militia” refers to a “state
military force . . . not to the people of the state as a whole.”329 Use of the
term in Articles I and II of the Constitution makes clear that the founders
were referring to a “government-established and -controlled military
[force]” which was to be “‘essentially organized and under control of the
states, but subject to regulation by Congress and to “federalization” at the
command of the president.’”330 “‘[M]ilitia’ refers to state military
organizations and not to their members or potential members throughout
these two Articles.”331 The term’s use in the Fifth Amendment, which
guarantees defendants a right to grand jury indictment “except in cases
arising in . . . the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger,” also implies that a militia is a “state entity, and not [a] collection
of individuals who may participate in it.”332
Some collective right advocates, like the appellee in Parker, also claim
that “the Framers’ militia has faded into insignificance,” and that the
applicability of the Second Amendment to individuals has therefore done
the same.333 Ultimately, however, the state right advocates also find
support in the Second Amendment’s text.

325. Id. at 1069 n.24. Prefatory clauses in state constitutions are treated as having
“limited significance”; however, that is not a reason to treat them the same way in the
Federal Constitution, where the Second Amendment’s preamble is unique. Id.
326. Id. at 1075; see supra text accompanying note 310.
327. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1085 n.51.
328. Id. at 1085 & n.51; see supra note 58.
329. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1069–70, 1070 n.25 (citing United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
330. Id. at 1070 (quoting Finkelman, supra note 14, at 204).
331. Id. at 1070.
332. Id. at 1070–71 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V).
333. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 231 n.30 (5th Cir. 2001); see supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
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b. Interpreting “State”
Using the word “state” in this phrase instead of Madison’s originally
proposed “best security of a free country,” proponents argue, shows that the
founders must have intended the term “militia” to refer to a permanent state
militia because it “emphasized the primacy of the state militia over the
federal standing army.”334 Silveira I cites Congressman Gerry’s statement
about a standing army during the House debates in support of this
reasoning.335
c. Interpreting “Well Regulated”
The Ninth Circuit held that the phrase “well regulated” shows that “‘the
Amendment does not apply to just anyone,’” but rather to a military force
“established and controlled by a governmental entity.”336 Presumably, only
the state could “regulate” the militia.
d. Interpreting “People”
Silveira I does not address the meaning of the term “people” in the
Second Amendment except to suggest in a footnote that it must be
construed identically throughout the Bill of Rights.337
e. Interpreting “Bear”
Silveira I found that during the founding era, the term “bear arms”
generally referred to the use of arms in a military context rather than a
A number of ratification-era sources support this
private one.338
understanding, including use of the term in the Declaration of Independence
and Madison’s proposed exemption of the “religiously scrupulous” from
bearing arms in his originally proposed version of the Amendment.339
Because no state at the time or earlier ever compelled people to carry
weapons in a private capacity, Madison’s use of the term must have referred
to the carrying of arms in service of the state.340
This interpretation is confirmed by an analysis of the term in the 1840
case of Aymette v. State, which stated that, as the term is used in the
Tennessee Constitution, “[a] man in pursuit of deer, elk and buffaloes might
carry his rifle every day for forty years, and yet it would never be said of
him that he had borne arms.”341 “Further, the Oxford English Dictionary
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1071; see supra text accompanying note 57.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 61.
Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Finkelman, supra note 14, at 234).
Id. at 1070 n.25.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1072–73; see supra text accompanying note 57.
Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1073–74 (citing Finkelman, supra note 14, at 228).
Id. at 1073 (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840)).
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defines ‘to bear arms’ as ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service,
fight.’”342 Thus, proponents claim, use of “bear” shows that a military, and
therefore state-controlled, function was intended.
f. Interpreting “Keep”
The Ninth Circuit held that the most reasonable reading of “keep and
bear” is to construe it as a “unitary phrase that relates to the maintenance of
arms for military service.”343 Because “[t]he only right to use arms
specified in the Constitution is the right to ‘bear’ them,” the term must not
be “broader in scope than the term ‘bear.’”344 However, “keep” may refer
to a state right to possess arms.345 In any case, “it [is] highly significant . . .
that the second clause does not purport to protect the right to ‘possess’ or
‘own’ arms, but rather to ‘keep and bear’ arms.”346
g. Interpreting “Arms”
The term “arms” has a military connotation, and therefore must refer to a
state’s right to arm its military forces.347
C. Summary
The individual right model maintains that Supreme Court precedent and
history strengthen what the Second Amendment’s text directly declares:
that the Amendment conveys an individual right to arms. The collective
right model maintains that, when read in accordance with Supreme Court
precedent, the rest of the Constitution, and history, the Second Amendment
can only be construed to convey a collective right.
Each model convincingly argues that historical evidence and its half of
the text, in a vacuum at least, support its view. The surfeit of historical
commentary mentioning individual firearm use and the substantive
guarantee’s use of terminology that the Constitution and framers always
used in reference to individuals imply an individual right.348 The founding
era’s concern with state military independence and the “militia” clause,
viewed separately, indicate a purely collective military motivation behind
the Second Amendment.349

342. Id. at 1073 (quoting 1 Oxford English Dictionary 634 (John A. Simpson & Edmond
S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989)).
343. Id. at 1074.
344. Id.
345. Id. (citing Finkelman, supra note 14, at 234).
346. Id. at 1072.
347. Id. at 1073 (citing English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1872); State v. Workman, 14
S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891)). The court says no more about this term than to cite these cases.
348. See supra Part II.A.
349. See supra Part II.B.

2154

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

III. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT MODEL: A MORE PLAUSIBLE RESPONSE
This part examines the Second Amendment debate primarily from the
historical and originalist viewpoints. In doing so, it shows that the founders
secured an individual right, and that the reasons for securing an individual
right in 1789 still apply today.350 The individual right model successfully
accounts for the portions of history, text, and precedent that support a
collective right view, while the collective right model is unsuccessful at
explaining away its weaknesses.
A. Popular Militias and Individual Rights
1. Internally Consistent Reading of the Constitution
The collective right view is inconsistent with Article I, Sections 8 and 10
of the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to call
forth, arm, organize, discipline, and proscribe training methods for the
militia.351 Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from keeping troops, but
allows them to wage war if invaded or if imminent danger requires.352
Recall that the Anti-Federalists claimed that Article I, Section 8, Clause 16
gave Congress the exclusive power to arm the militias,353 while the
Federalists claimed that it was concurrent with the states’ power,354 and that
Madison’s proposed amendments sought to leave the balance of power
between the federal and state governments untouched while making explicit
certain principles that were implicit in the original Constitution.355
If Congress’s power over the militia was exclusive, which is the more
likely assumption given that the Senate rejected the proposed amendment
explicitly granting states the power to arm their militias,356 then the
collective right model effectively holds that the Second Amendment
repealed Article I, Section 8. This would conflict with the intent of the
Amendments;357 Miller’s decree that the Second Amendment must be read
in harmony with Article I, Section 8, Clause 16;358 and Supreme Court
precedent that federal power over the militia is plenary, with state authority
existing only insofar as it is consistent with federal authority.359

350. See supra note 11.
351. See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cls. 15, 16; 1 Stat. 14 (1787).
352. See U.S. Const. art. I, §10, cl. 3; 1 Stat. 15 (1787).
353. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.
354. See supra text accompanying note 41.
355. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 68.
357. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 266.
359. See supra note 195; infra note 511 (describing how the President has the power to
take control of the National Guard, removing it from state control).
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The collective right model also assumes a state-run select militia.360
State maintenance of such military forces is prohibited by Article I, Section
10, which forbids states from keeping troops.361 Further, a select militia,
feared as much as a standing army, would not be consistent with the
Federalist/Anti-Federalist bargain.362 Thus, with the states out of the
picture, only the people were left as a counterweight to the federal
government’s monopoly on military power, fulfilling the bargain’s concern
with tyranny. This description fits with the Bill of Rights’ intent to clarify
what is implied—that the people were already presumed to have arms.363
The collective right model proposes that Congress’s power over the
militia was concurrent with that of the states because the original
Constitution made no mention of such a state power, and the Second
Amendment merely reaffirms the right of states to secure themselves
against the federal government per the Federalist/Anti-Federalist bargain.364
However, this proposition was already explicitly provided for by Article I,
Section 10, which allowed states to go to war if invaded.365 There is no
reason to presume that this exception to going to war did not apply to attack
by the federal government. If the states can defend themselves when
attacked but cannot keep troops, the only remaining possibility is that an
armed population must be relied upon. This is what the Second
Amendment explicitly reaffirms, not a state right that is inconsistent with at
least one, and perhaps both, of the Constitution’s existing group armsbearing provisions,366 which no one claims were repealed. Thus, the
Second Amendment can only have referred to an individual right.
2. History Supports an Individual Right
The vast array of historical material supporting the individual right model
overwhelms the evidence supporting a nonindividual, collective right. The
individual right model is consistent with the collective right model’s focus
on the preservation of state militias.367 Anti-Federalist concerns about the
federal government’s monopoly over the tools of violence relied upon by
the collective right model368 are addressed by the individual ownership of
arms: if individuals are armed, the federal government no longer has its
monopoly and the population can resist tyranny.369 The satisfaction of the
360. See supra note 37 for a definition of “select militia” and Part II.B.2 for the collective
right model’s conformity with the definition. See also Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment,
Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 103, 106 (1987).
361. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; 1 Stat. 15 (1787); see supra text accompanying note 31.
362. See supra notes 37, 103, 220 and accompanying text.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56, 310.
365. See supra text accompanying note 31.
366. U.S. Const. art. 1, §§ 8, 10; 1 Stat. 14–15 (1787).
367. See Lund, supra note 360, at 106. See generally Nelson Lund, The Past and Future
of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
368. See supra Part II.B.2.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 213, 215.
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Anti-Federalist side of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist bargain as to the
militia/standing army controversy depended upon the people being
armed.370 Founding-era statements and commentary must be considered in
this light.
The Amendment’s legislative history is filled with evidence supporting
an individual right. State ratification history of the original Constitution
shows that the Anti-Federalists both wanted and thought they were getting
an individual right later on as part of their bargain with the Federalists.371
Madison’s original wording and the House of Representatives’ approved
wording clearly granting an individual right,372 along with the Senate’s
rejection of limiting language, support this view.373
Congressman Scott’s statement during the House debates is perhaps the
clearest indication that the Second Amendment secured an individual
right.374 Congressman Scott very likely referred to the version of the
Amendment adopted three days earlier, which he correctly assumed would
be ratified and thus guarantee an individual right.375 He feared that the
individual right could be eviscerated by Congress declaring people
religiously scrupulous, forcing the nation to rely on a standing army.376
Direct statements of the Amendment’s drafters, as well as those on the
periphery and those of the nonelite commenting in newspapers and
elsewhere, are likewise rife with statements assuming377 or explicitly
describing378 an individual right—either directly or via a popular militia—
to possess weapons, and not a state-controlled select militia. That these
views were widespread and undisputed speaks for itself.379
The relevant commentary is not restricted to the federal military
monopoly context. Jefferson’s statement relating to defense and crime
makes no reference to federal tyranny,380 and there is no reason to refer to
“wild Beast[s]” and “fowling” in relation to a provision granting state
power.381 There is simply no intellectually honest way to interpret the
plethora of statements about the Amendment from both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists as not assuming an underlying individual right to possess a
weapon.

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
130.
379.
380.
381.

See supra text accompanying notes 41–42, 107, 113, 115–16, 119, 121, 211, 240.
See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59, 217.
See supra text accompanying note 67.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
See supra notes 59, 61–62 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 62, 217.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–43, 104, 106, 107, 111, 121, 123.
See supra text accompanying notes 50, 100–01, 103, 109, 113, 115–17, 119, 122,
See, e.g., supra notes 111, 116, 123 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
See supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text.
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The abundance of arms-bearing provisions in state constitutions indicates
that the concept of individual arms ownership was not new to the nation.382
The state constitutional guarantees had to be individual ones because there
is no entity lower on the “stepladder” to which the right could be secured:
at the national level, where state governments exist between the federal
government and the people, the concept of a state right may be concocted
(by ignoring the substantive guarantee and the Amendment’s history) by
claiming that the Constitution reserved the right to the states. However, at
the state level, where no such middleman exists, such a concept is
implausible. Indeed, Vermont, while still an independent nation, explicitly
guaranteed its people an individual right to bear arms years before the
United States did.383
Bills of rights in state constitutions reinforce the general understanding,
by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, that the Bill of Rights secured
individual rights as opposed to state powers.384 Federalists endorsed this
view with respect to the Second Amendment by taking it for granted that
Americans were armed;385 Anti-Federalists did so by explicitly asking for a
bill of rights guaranteeing individual rights.386
Dred Scott’s assumption of an individual right,387 Presser’s
distinguishing the personal right to keep and bear arms from the state’s
authority to drill militarily,388 and Miller’s weapon-based holding389 all
bespeak an individual right. That a collective right was contrived over fifty
years after the Second Amendment’s adoption, and first appeared in a
holding over sixty years after that, shows how foreign it was to the
founding era.390
3. Natural Rights, Tyranny, and the American Dream
The founding-era view of the Bill of Rights is consistent with its
precursor, the English Bill of Rights, and the natural law concepts
underlying it.391 The natural right to self-defense, both against individual
aggressors and tyrannical states, has been acknowledged for millennia.392
Hobbes and Locke ingrained it into Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it
so permeated American legal culture that, in addition to profoundly
influencing the founders, it explicitly appeared in state constitutions,
ratification debates, congressional debates on the Bill of Rights, and
382. See supra Part I.A.3.
383. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 106–22.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43, 119, 121, 130.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 25–28, 39, 52, 55, 122.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 187–88.
388. Gun Control & Gun Rights: A Reader & Guide, supra note 134, at 160; Kates,
supra note 27, at 246; see supra text accompanying notes 180–82.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 193–94, 199–200, 287.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 296–300.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 140, 143–44.
392. See supra Part I.B.2.
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political commentary.393 Thus, one cannot doubt that the Second
Amendment secured this preexisting natural right.
The Supreme Court has endorsed this understanding, both generally with
respect to the Bill of Rights,394 and specifically with regard to the Second
Amendment in Cruikshank by recognizing that the right to bear arms
predates the Constitution and is not dependent on it for its existence.395
This is perfectly understandable in the common law system that the early
Americans inherited. The Federalist/Anti-Federalist fight was over the
army and militia; under the individual right view, the Second Amendment
confirmed what people already expected.396 The collective right model
proposes a new dynamic with respect to the control of violence that runs
counter to centuries of Anglo-American history.397
The founders, their predecessors, and contemporaries spoke of
individuals directly protecting themselves from tyranny without a
governmental intermediary, implying an individual right.398 Their foresight
has proven itself accurate given that there are no cases of the federal
government unjustifiably attacking any states399 but plenty of cases of it
oppressing individuals directly.400 The internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II is perhaps the most infamous of these, with the
Supreme Court holding the detention constitutional in Korematsu v. United
States.401 Neither California, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu’s state, nor any
of the other coastal states where the internment order was in effect, did
anything to protect their citizens from the federal government.402
During the 1992 Ruby Ridge incident in Idaho, camouflaged government
forces attacked a family in an Idaho backwoods cabin, killing a fourteenyear-old boy and his mother in front of the mother’s other children.403 The

393. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53, 76, 82, 84, 88, 90, 135–44, 146–47, 224–
27.
394. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 179, 224 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.1.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 224–29; see also supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42, 111, 115; see also supra Part II.B.3. But
see text accompanying note 130 (discussing Adams’s statement that implied that he held the
contrary view).
399. Some consider the Civil War an exception on the grounds that secession is legal.
See generally, e.g., Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government
(1881). The Supreme Court held otherwise. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
400. See, e.g., infra notes 401–14.
401. 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944).
402. See generally, e.g., Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United
States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 72 (1996) (examining
Korematsu v. United States and Japanese internment in detail, but not mentioning states
coming to any citizen’s aid).
403. Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 362–63, 362 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated
as moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The boy was shot in the back while he was
fleeing, and the mother was shot in the face while holding her baby. Id.; Gordon Witkin, The
Nightmare of Idaho’s Ruby Ridge: As a New Inquiry Begins, Questions Linger, U.S. News
& World Report, Sept. 11, 1995, at 24, 29, 30.
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family fought back with its private arms, resulting in a federal marshal’s
death.404 The father and a family friend, who fired at the marshal, were
acquitted on all charges relating to the agent’s death.405 A jury also
acquitted the father, on entrapment grounds, of the original charge which
brought the federal force to the cabin in the first place.406 After
declarations of unconstitutional actions,407 a Senate investigation finding
that the federal government had weakened the trust between itself and its
citizens,408 a court holding that “the FBI had shown a ‘callous disregard for
the rights of defendants and the interests of justice,’”409 numerous agent
suspensions,410 and a conviction,411 the end result was that the
government’s procedures were changed so that such an event would not
recur.412 In this instance, the individuals involved did not need the
assistance of state governments to protect themselves from tyranny. That
day, Idaho did nothing to protect its citizens,413 just as California did
nothing for Korematsu fifty years earlier.414
Though both individual and collective right adherents agree that
protection from federal tyranny was an important concern, others outside
the present circuit split argue that the Constitution forbids rebellion, and it
404. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 362.
405. Timothy Egan, Idaho Prosecutor Charges 2 in Killings at Ruby Ridge, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1997, at A14; State Charges Dismissed in Ruby Ridge Standoff, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1997, at A13.
406. Witkin, supra note 403, at 24. One can only imagine how egregiously the
government acted for an entrapment defense to succeed. To make matters worse, there were
later cover-ups within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Tim Weiner, U.S. Will
Bring No More Criminal Charges Against F.B.I. Officials in Ruby Ridge Siege, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 16, 1997, at 6.
407. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 377 (stating that the “wartime rules” of engagement adopted
by the federal government were “patently unconstitutional”); id. at 363 n.2, 364 n.5, 373,
377 n.28; Witkin, supra note 403, at 30 (stating that the shot killing the mother was
unconstitutional because the FBI agent taking the shot was not in imminent danger as his
target was running away).
408. David Johnston, Senate Report Faults F.B.I. and Other Agencies on Idaho Incident,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1995, at A35.
409. Witkin, supra note 403, at 30.
410. Weiner, supra note 406; Witkin, supra note 403, at 30.
411. Egan, supra note 405 (reporting that an agent was convicted of obstruction of justice
for attempting to destroy FBI records of the event).
412. Examining Certain Federal Law Enforcement Actions with Regard to the 1992
Incident at Ruby Ridge, ID: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and
Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 998, 1001–09
(1995) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation); see U.S.
Officials Say Firearms Agency Has Made Reforms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1995, at A19. The
1993 Waco, Texas, disaster, where a “botched” federal assault on a religious sect resulted in
a fire that killed eighty sect members, including children, also resulted in reforms to federal
procedures. U.S. Officials Say Firearms Agency Has Made Reforms, supra; Weiner, supra
note 406.
413. In fact, it later attempted to prosecute its citizens for their self-defense. See Egan,
supra note 405.
414. See supra note 402 and accompanying text. This example may partly explain why
only a minority of Americans wants to ban guns. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 762–63, 785
n.394.
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thus makes no sense that a constitutional provision would protect it.415
However, the rebellion protected is not necessarily a destructive one that
extinguishes the existing government, but rather a “conservative” one that
restores constitutional order from a government exceeding its enumerated
powers.416 This is what happened on a small scale at Ruby Ridge: the
government took unconstitutional actions,417 those having their rights
trammeled fought back,418 and constitutional order was restored by the
correction of governmental policies.419 The founders likely looked at their
“war for independence” similarly, and wrote the Second Amendment to
protect their posterity’s right to individual use of force against the
government, but only to the extent that tyrannical conduct is held at bay.420
4. The Second Amendment’s Preamble Evinces an Individual Right
When looked at in context, the Second Amendment is not as unclear as
one might initially believe. Its placement among nine Amendments
protecting individual interests implies that it has a similar purpose.421 This
understanding is greatly strengthened by Madison’s originally proposed
insertion of the Amendment, along with every other portion of the Bill of
Rights, into a section of the Constitution limiting governmental power and
adjacent to clauses specifically protecting individual rights.422
This placement is consistent with the understanding that the
Amendment’s preamble is a philosophical declaration of one of the civic
purposes that it was meant to secure.423 Given the Federalist/AntiFederalist controversy over the control of military power,424 it is logical that
the framers chose to mention a militiacentric civic purpose.

415. See generally Henigan, supra note 2.
416. See Williams, supra note 16, passim.
417. See supra notes 403, 407 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 406, 409 and
accompanying text.
418. See supra text accompanying note 404.
419. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Considerations of individual defense
from tyranny are also still relevant outside the United States. Recognizing that it is a
delicate topic that touches many deeply, the atrocity of the Holocaust is worth briefly
considering in this context. One cannot legitimately argue that Jews being taken away by the
Gestapo had no right to fight back then and there, especially given their ultimate destination.
As Judge Alex Kozinski very aptly said, “If a few hundred Jewish fighters in the Warsaw
Ghetto could hold off the Wehrmacht for almost a month with only a handful of weapons,
six million Jews armed with rifles could not so easily have been herded into cattle cars.”
Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). He rightly called the Second Amendment a “doomsday
provision” to be relied on in those “exceptionally rare” circumstances when government fails
its people entirely. Id. Thomas Jefferson would not have even waited for an exceptionally
rare occurrence, actually wanting periodic rebellions. See supra text accompanying note 156.
421. See supra text accompanying note 230.
422. See supra notes 58, 231 and accompanying text.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 233–41.
424. See supra Part I.A.1.
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Philosophical declarations were common at the time of the founding.
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s claim to the contrary,425 the Constitution
contains another preamble declaring a civic purpose: “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”426 Numerous state constitutions
contained such philosophical declarations,427 as did amendments proposed
by both houses of Congress to be sent to the states with the Bill of
Rights.428 The original version of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
also contained a philosophical declaration: “[T]rial by jury as one of the
best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.”429
The framers never intended the Second Amendment’s preamble, or the
proposed preamble to the right to a jury trial and the preamble to the
Copyright Clause, to limit its substantive guarantee.430
Suppose that the First Amendment contained a sentence reading, “A
well-schooled electorate, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and read Books, shall not be infringed.”431
Freedom-loving Americans would never interpret the sentence “to restrict
the right to keep and read books to a well-schooled electorate—say,
registered voters with a high-school diploma.”432 To do so would be
grammatically and linguistically incorrect.433
The Second Amendment’s structure indicates that its preamble does not
detract from its assumption of the existence of the substantive right, nor is
anything in the preamble a prerequisite for it.434 Use of an indefinite article
in the “a free State” portion of the preamble rather than one of the definite
articles used elsewhere in the Constitution also supports the idea that it is a
philosophical declaration.435 The founding-era understanding confirms that
the preamble is merely an observation without binding character.436
Thus, it is clear that the final adopted version of the Second Amendment
is essentially shorthand of the original House version of what was so
obvious at the time as to go without saying: individuals had a right to arms,
and militias were important.437 Numerous contemporary statements and
425. See supra notes 323, 325 and accompanying text.
426. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 1 Stat. 14 (1787).
427. See supra note 325.
428. See supra notes 61, 69.
429. 1 Annals of Cong. 453 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789).
430. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 582 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that it is indefensible “to limit the
Congressional power to grant copyrights only to those writings that actually do ‘promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts’”).
431. Resnick, supra note 104, at 4.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 2–11.
434. See id. at 7.
435. See supra text accompanying note 254.
436. See supra text accompanying note 123.
437. Malcolm, supra note 12, at 161 (noting that Congress streamlined the Amendment’s
language because there was a shared understanding of its meaning). In fact, a similar
abbreviation, of the Judiciary Act of 1789, was taking place practically concurrently with the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, in which the Senate reduced forty-five words to twelve.
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their underlying assumptions confirm this understanding.438 Madison’s
referring to “other accustomed requisites” regarding the future Sixth
Amendment shows that the intent was to include that which was so obvious
or a part of tradition that it did not need to be spelled out in great detail.439
The Second Amendment protects the militia by granting the right to bear
arms directly to citizens, rather than to a potentially ineffectual state
The individual right model thus reads the Second
middleman.440
Amendment’s phrases as coexisting rather than conflicting—the preamble
promotes and justifies the substantive guarantee, but does not weaken it.441
However, as the remainder of this section shows, even if the Amendment
consisted only of its preamble, an individual—and likely nearly universal—
right would be guaranteed.
a. Understanding “Militia”
It is abundantly clear that “militia,” both at the founding and now, refers
to a vast segment of the population rather than a limited militarily affiliated
subset. The term has been defined explicitly by the Second Congress
through the Militia Act of 1792, the Supreme Court in Miller, and current
statute.442 The understanding that the militia is a popular one is reinforced
by the Second Amendment’s legislative history, where states (via their
ratification conventions) and Congress made such an understanding
clear,443 as well as by the array of contemporary and subsequent
commentary on the nature of the militia.444
There is no organizational precedent to the existence of the militia, either
at the founding or today. The Constitution itself differentiates between the
active and inactive militia,445 and both the 1792 and current militia
definitions include active/organized and inactive/unorganized members.446
Miller also assumed that virtually all people have the requisite connection
with the militia.447
One question that remains open is whether women and men outside the
age range specified by the current militia definition could possess arms
under only the preamble. If legislative history and commentary of the time
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 49, 84–88 (1923). Recall that it was the same Senate that abridged the House’s more
elaborate formulation of the Second Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69.
438. See supra Part I.B.1.
439. 1 Annals of Cong. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789).
440. See supra note 241 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 413–14;
see also supra Part II.B.3.
441. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73, 196, 242–47.
443. See supra Part I.A.2.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 103, 113, 115, 129.
445. See supra note 248. But see supra text accompanying note 332.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
447. See supra notes 196, 200. The Court presumably excluded criminals, and perhaps
others, including women. See supra notes 193, 196.
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is the guide, then the whole “body of the people” may possess arms448
because a government-defined militia would cause the Second
Amendment’s “purpose [to be] defeated altogether.”449 In addition, Parker
held that equal protection doctrines would ensure the right to all citizens.450
Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, in his Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II) dissent,
opined that Congress could never define the militia more narrowly than
Miller did, but could expand the definition, as the current statute has.451 In
any case, the right to bear arms inheres to a very large segment of the
population.
b. Understanding “State”
The term “State” refers to a sovereign government rather than a state of
the union. Madison’s originally proposed use of the word “country” in the
Amendment supports this understanding,452 and Congressman Gerry’s
objection confirms it.453 Thomas Sheridan’s popular dictionary, published
in 1789, also defined “state” as, inter alia, “the community, the publick, the
commonwealth.”454 On the other hand, the overwhelming use of “state” to
refer to a member of the union in the Constitution cuts against this
interpretation: of the 119 times the word appears, 116 refer to a state of the
union,455 while only two refer to a “hypothetical polity.”456
However, this debate becomes moot with respect to the individual right
model if the preamble is a philosophical declaration or if the clauses are
coexisting.457 In the former case, the individual substantive guarantee is
unaffected. In the latter case, the question becomes of which “state”—
national or of the union—the substantive guarantee is intended to ensure the
security, leaving the nature of the right unaffected.

448. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 59, 100, 103, 115.
449. Cooley, supra note 128, at 271; see supra notes 72, 129 and accompanying text.
450. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“To the extent
that non-whites, women, and the propertyless were excluded from the protections afforded to
‘the people,’ the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is understood to
have corrected that initial constitutional shortcoming.”).
451. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 581–82 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see supra text accompanying note 73.
452. See supra text accompanying note 57.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 251–53 (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. and Fifth Circuits’ interpretations of Elbridge Gerry’s remarks). But see supra
text accompanying notes 334–35 (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of Gerry’s remarks). The Ninth Circuit’s leap of logic with respect to
Congressman Gerry’s statement is a stretch; the D.C. and Fifth Circuits’ logic is much more
internally cohesive.
454. Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (Phila., Young
1789).
455. Parker, 478 F.3d at 405 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
456. See supra text accompanying note 249. Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 and the
Eleventh Amendment are the two such references.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 233–41, 423–35, 441.
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c. Understanding “Well Regulated”
It is clear that the militia’s popular nature does not evaporate by
becoming well regulated.458 As Hamilton’s Federalist paper and the
Militia Act of 1792 show, the regulation referred to by the Second
Amendment was not the disarmament of the people when they were not
actively fighting; rather, it was the requirement that, even when not
fighting, the people arm themselves and be ready for muster according to
the standards set by Congress under its Article I, Section 8, Clause 16
militia power.459
The understanding of the word “regulate” supports this view. Sheridan’s
dictionary defines it as “to adjust by rule or method; to direct.”460 This
definition presupposes something to regulate before the regulation takes
place. Thus, the popular militia could be directed or adjusted by rules, but
not disarmed or made nonexistent. The militia is, after all, “necessary.”461
B. “People” Does Not Mean “States”
The collective right model only has a basis in reality if “people” is read
to mean “states.” However, as demonstrated in this section, “people” does
not mean “states.”
1. Internally Inconsistent Reading of the Constitution
The collective right model suffers a fatal blow by interpreting the Second
Amendment in conflict with Article I, Sections 8 and 10 of the
Constitution.462 As discussed, disharmony exists whether the collective
right model construes the Amendment to grant a new right to states to arm
their militias, or merely to reaffirm the existence of the right.463
The collective right model, as presented in and adopted by Silveira I, also
attempts to drown out an acknowledged individual right by couching it in
collective terms. It is difficult to comprehend what “the people’s right to
maintain an effective state militia”464 and similar statements465 might mean
if not an individual right of some sort. Statements such as “the Second
Amendment . . . seeks to ensure the existence of effective state militias in
which the people may exercise their right to bear arms,” and “the
amendment was enacted to guarantee that the people would be able to
maintain an effective state fighting force—that they would have the right to
458. See supra text accompanying notes 255–59.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 43, 56, 214–19; supra notes 68–69, 72 and
accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1.
460. Sheridan, supra note 454.
461. See U.S. Const. amend. II; 1 Stat. 21 (1789).
462. See supra Part III.A.1.
463. See supra Part III.A.1.
464. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra text
accompanying note 302.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 315, 317.

2008]

CHARACTERIZING THE SECOND AMENDMENT

2165

bear arms in the service of the state” also recognize an individual right of
some sort.466 The meaning of these statements ultimately depends on the
definition of “militia.” As shown, the bargain struck at the founding
precluded the existence of a select militia or other state fighting entity;467
Article I, Section 10 forbids the keeping of state troops anyway;468 and
anything but a popular militia would be inconsistent with statute and
Supreme Court precedent.469 Further, it is inconsistent with the collective
right model’s own claim that governments have “full authority” to regulate
the right470—else it would not be a “right.”
2. History Does Not Support a Collective Right
The collective right model’s contention that the Second Amendment
exists to allow states to arm their select militias so that they could defend
the people from the federal government is nothing more than the individual
right model with a middleman.
The idea that the new Constitution accomplished everything that both the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists desired, including strengthening the militia
by giving Congress power over it471 is untenable. If Congress has power to
manage the militias and dictate how the states should act, then the states’
fears of having lost all military power are realized and there is no
“compromise.”472 In fact, even if Congress and the states are assumed to
have concurrent power to organize and arm the militias, the state power
would nonetheless be useless because, as recognized by Madison, the
Necessary and Proper Clause would allow Congress to override any state
actions with respect to their militias.473 This was certainly no compromise
to the Anti-Federalists, and it explicitly undermines the Federalists’ claim
that no bill of rights was necessary because the government was one of
enumerated powers only.474
The idea that the Second Amendment clarified that Congress’s power
over the militia was not exclusive is likewise untenable. Both sides agree
that the Amendment did not alter the balance of federal/state military
466. Silveira I, 312 F.3d at 1075, 1076. In any case, “[t]he ‘right’ to be a soldier . . . [is]
hardly a cherished right” that would have been constitutionally protected. Leonard W. Levy,
Origins of the Bill of Rights 134–35 (1999).
467. See supra Parts I.A, III.A.
468. See supra text accompanying note 31. But see supra text accompanying note 330.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73, 196. But see supra text accompanying
notes 329, 332.
470. See supra notes 279 and accompanying text.
471. See supra text accompanying note 305.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 32–38, 305. The Supreme Court has confirmed
that Congress’s militia power is plenary. See supra notes 195, 359 and accompanying text.
473. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; 1 Stat. 14 (1787); see 1 Annals of Cong. 455–56
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789) (recognizing that delegated federal
powers could be used to infringe on state powers).
474. See 1 Annals of Cong. at 790 (proceedings of Aug. 18, 1789) (“[I]t was impossible
to confine a Government to the exercise of express powers; there must necessarily be
admitted powers by implication.”); supra text accompanying notes 25, 40.
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power.475 Thus, if this is the case, then the Second Amendment did nothing
to alter the unacceptable (to the Anti-Federalists) arrangement described in
the previous paragraph. Next, the Ninth Circuit’s claim that the original
Constitution made clear that Congress’s power over the militia was
nonexclusive because it “may” arm the militias fails because the “may” in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 has nothing to do with arming, but rather
with the possibility that some of the militia “may” be federalized.476 The
lack of nonexclusivity is confirmed by the explicit rejection of the
amendment allowing states to arm their militias.477 Under this scenario, the
Second Amendment would likewise not have effectuated the compromise
with the Anti-Federalists. This leaves an individual right to fulfill the
Federalists’ obligation to the bargain.478
The collective right model claims that all militia-related discussion was
in the context of arming power being taken from the states by the new
Constitution, and that the discussion indicates that the Second Amendment
was intended to remedy this imbalance of power.479 This argument is
refuted by both legislative history and political commentary. The clearest
indication of the falsity of this view is the Senate’s rejection of an
amendment stating as much.480 Again, the only option left at this point is
an interpretation supporting an individual right. The claim that only a “few
isolated voices” during the ratification debates wanted an individual right is
false, as the records of amendment proposals show.481
Further, that the New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia
ratification debates, which produced arms proposals most similarly worded
to the Second Amendment, only briefly discussed an individual right482
does not militate in favor of a collective construction of their proposals, and
thus the Second Amendment. First, failure to acknowledge references to
both an individual right and a popular militia in these proposals is
disingenuous, given the concession that there was some talk of an
individual right and the everyday, noncontroversial nature of arms
ownership at the time.483 In addition, it is not at all surprising that the bulk
of debate related to the fight over a standing army and militia control, as
that issue was at the forefront while an individual right to arms was
assumed.484

475. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 308.
477. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 218–19.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 311–22.
480. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
481. Compare supra text accompanying notes 44–53 (describing the amendment
proposals), with supra text accompanying note 321 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s “few
isolated voices” claim).
482. See supra text accompanying note 319.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 48–53, 76–90, 121.
484. See supra note 483 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.1.
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The assertion that there were no statements during the congressional
debates supporting an individual right485 is not only false, but also
misleading. First, the history of the Amendment’s wording itself shows that
the framers envisioned both an individual right and a popular militia.486
Next, Congressman Scott explicitly referred to an individual right to arms
in conjunction with the future Second Amendment.487 Finally, the assertion
is misleading because the Senate debates were closed, making it impossible
for one to refer to specific statements by senators.488
The utter nonexistence of any third-party statements supporting a
nonindividual intent behind the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”
speaks loudly for itself.489 Given that the Second Amendment refers so
explicitly to “the people,” one would expect both insiders and outsiders to
the political process to clarify that it provided a collective right if one were
intended.490 Such clarification is exactly what routinely and explicitly took
place with respect to the meaning of “militia.”491
In particular, the statements upon which the Ninth Circuit relies are taken
grossly and selectively out of context. First, in claiming that Madison’s
Federalist No. 46 words referred to state-run militias bearing arms in the
service of state governments,492 the Ninth Circuit (1) bypasses with
convenient ellipses the phrase referring to “a militia amounting to near half
a million of citizens with arms in their hands”; (2) does not acknowledge
that state governments are referred to as having the people on their side,
implying that the people are the militia allying with the state; (3) does not
acknowledge that its reference to “militia” only connects the militias to
state governments via the appointment of officers; and (4) leaves out the
portion of the text noting that, unlike the United States, European kingdoms
were afraid to trust their people with arms.493
Next, the Ninth Circuit’s claim that Patrick Henry, George Mason, and
Richard Henry Lee speaking of the danger to militias in the context of the
militia/standing army controversy supports the collective right model494
ignores the fact that all three of these statesmen spoke of the militia

485. See supra text accompanying note 318.
486. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 374–76.
488. See supra text accompanying note 65.
489. U.S. Const. amend II; 1 Stat. 21 (1789); see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
490. See supra text accompanying note 235. The author contacted the Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence (formerly Handgun Control, Inc.) via telephone and e-mail on
October 24, 2007, and November 5, 2007, requesting assistance in locating commentary
supporting the collective right model. To date, no response has been received. See supra
note 131.
491. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 100, 103, 115.
492. See supra text accompanying note 311.
493. See supra text accompanying note 42. The rub is that the court then accuses
individual right theorists of taking the passage out of context. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira
I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1080 n.41 (9th Cir. 2002).
494. See supra text accompanying note 312.
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consisting of the population as a whole.495 Mason specifically spoke of an
individual right as well, while Lee explicitly decried the idea of a select
militia which the court claims his statements support.496 The court further
states that Mason and Lee never advocated a “purely private right to
arms.”497 This objection ignores the fact that the individual right was, in
part, supposed to ensure the existence of the militia, making it
understandable that they discussed the two concepts together.498 When the
court suggests that John Adams ridiculed the concept of an individual
right,499 it artfully leaves out of its citation the portion of President Adams’s
statement recognizing a right to arms for “private self-defense.”500
Adams’s statement contradicts the assertion that the framers only
considered a nonindividual purpose for the Second Amendment. Finally,
that Jefferson never mentioned an individual right in his letter to
Madison501 is not proof of its nonexistence, especially given the common
nature of arms ownership at the time,502 and his inclusion of an armsbearing guarantee in the model state constitution he wrote for Virginia in
1776.503
3. Misplaced Reliance on State Governments for Protection
While there is a fair amount of dispute over whether the Second
Amendment actually grants a right or merely acknowledges rights that
already exist,504 the collective right model does not rely on the argument
one way or the other. The Silveira I court does recognize that a purpose of
the Second Amendment was to prevent tyranny by the federal government,
but it assumes that only the states were entitled to resist.505 It further skirts
the issue by implying that the individual right model assumes that an
“‘unregulated’ mob,” like the farmers of Shays’s rebellion or another
private conglomeration, will be left exercising the preserved right.506
Two implications follow from the collective right model’s unwillingness
or inability to directly rebut the natural right arguments put forth by
individual right adherents. First, the model effectively concedes that the
Anglo-American natural right tradition cuts strongly against its arguments.

495. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 100, 103.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 103.
497. See supra text accompanying note 313.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 233–41.
499. See supra text accompanying note 316.
500. See supra text accompanying note 130.
501. See supra text accompanying note 314.
502. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 48–53, 76–90, 121, 396.
503. See Kates, supra note 27, at 229.
504. Compare, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 126, at 1003 (arguing that the Second
Amendment preserved a preexisting right), with Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the
Second Amendment, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 237 (2000) (arguing that no natural right was
preserved by the Second Amendment).
505. See supra Parts I.A.1, II.B.2.
506. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Second, it implies that individuals have nothing to fear from their state
governments. However, states have proven that they are not to be relied
upon when the federal government assails their citizens.507 Madison,
speaking of his proposed amendment limiting the power of states to violate
the rights of conscience, press, or jury trial during the House ratification
debates, recognized that “there is more danger of . . . powers being abused
by the State Governments than by the Government of the United States.”508
Similarly, though the Second Amendment has never been incorporated,509
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that Amendment to
compel the states to respect the Second Amendment along with the other
fundamental individual guarantees of the first eight Amendments.510
Even if the states right model is accepted, the ultimate resort to the use of
violence for protection against the federal government does not disappear.
For example, under the states right model, Arkansas gets to fight back in
1957 Little Rock.511 Thus, as in Madison’s time,512 there is still significant
doubt whether state governments can be trusted with a monopoly on the use
of violence with respect to their people.513
Again granting the state right model, its proponents do not explain why
the roughly forty-three states whose constitutions contain individual arms
guarantees514 have complete authority to regulate private arms
Madison himself, during the Second Amendment’s
ownership.515
congressional debates, spoke of state constitutions guaranteeing rights and

507. See supra text accompanying notes 399–414; see also Letter from Tom Washington,
President, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, to George Bush, Former President of the United States (May
10, 1995), in N.Y. Times, May 15, 1995, at A11 (paid advertisement by the Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n) (citing federal abuses of power against individuals and noting that a poll found that
“fifty-two percent of those questioned agreed that ‘ . . . the federal government has become
so powerful that it poses a threat to the rights and freedoms of citizens’”).
508. 1 Annals of Cong. 458 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789); see
id. at 784 (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789); supra note 58.
509. See supra notes 178–82, 184, 285–86. The Parker dissent, assuming that the
Amendment refers to a state of the union, makes the argument that it does not restrict the
District of Columbia’s actions because it is not a state. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478
F.3d 370, 404–09 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Henderson, J., dissenting). The dissent thus implicitly
adopts an “explicit incorporation” stance, saying that the Second Amendment applies to the
states by its very terms. While individual right adherents would relish such a concept, it is in
obvious conflict with the incorporation doctrine.
510. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
511. During the crisis at Central High School, the governor of Arkansas, citing “states
rights,” called out the National Guard to prevent nine students from attending the school as
per an integration plan mandated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Nat’l Park Serv., Crisis Timeline, http://www.nps.gov/chsc/historyculture/timeline.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2008). In response, President Dwight D. Eisenhower took control of the
Arkansas National Guard and sent in federal troops to escort the students into school. Id.
512. See supra text accompanying note 508.
513. Under the collective right model, states would be entitled to possess even atomic
weapons to oppose federal tyranny. See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 265, at 1756.
514. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
515. See supra text accompanying note 279.
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the federal Constitution not infringing on them.516 In other words, in a
system where the federal government cannot infringe on state power,517
these forty-three states, via their state constitutions, have either delegated
their Second Amendment power to their citizens, or independently granted
the right to arms to their citizens
4. The Second Amendment’s Substantive Guarantee Speaks for Itself
Despite the collective model’s claims to the contrary, the Second
Amendment’s substantive guarantee could not be clearer or more
straightforward.
The collective right model interprets the Second Amendment’s preamble
to obviate entirely its substantive guarantee.518 It relies primarily on the
portion of Miller stating that the weapon in question must have some
reasonable relation to the preservation of the militia.519 However, this
stance ignores the fact that Miller adopted a weapon-based argument,
rejecting the defendant’s constitutional claim on the grounds that his
weapon did not relate to a militia.520 Thus, rather than “read the first clause
out of the amendment,”521 the individual right view adopts one of two items
Miller made clear: the preamble’s purpose is to define the type of arms that
may be owned.522
The collective model’s claim that the preamble is not a philosophical
declaration or civic purpose because one does not appear elsewhere in the
Constitution fails primarily because it is based on a faulty premise: another
civic purpose does appear in the Constitution, in the Copyright Clause.523
Thus, because the Constitution contains another preamble that is interpreted
similarly to those in state constitutions, the presence of preambles in state
constitutions becomes relevant.524 This view is strengthened by Madison’s
likely having looked at state constitutions to come up with his phrasing,525
the greater role states played in national affairs at the time of the

516. 1 Annals of Cong. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789)
(“[T]his Government has not repealed those declarations of rights which are added to the
several State constitutions . . . .”).
517. U.S. Const. amend. X; 1 Stat. 21–22 (1789) (“The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people.”); see supra text accompanying notes 18, 25–27, 40; see also
infra text accompanying note 537.
518. See supra Part II.B.3.
519. See supra text accompanying note 287, 289–90.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 193–94, 198–200.
521. See supra text accompanying note 325.
522. Miller also defined the militia. See supra text accompanying notes 196, 242–47, 442.
523. See supra text accompanying note 423; supra notes 426, 430 and accompanying
text. But see supra note 323 and accompanying text; supra note 325.
524. But see supra note 323 and accompanying text; supra note 325.
525. Gun Control & Gun Rights: A Reader & Guide, supra note 134, at 212.
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founding,526 and the fact that Miller referred to state constitutions in its
analysis.527
The argument that the Second Amendment’s placement among other
Amendments granting individual rights is irrelevant to proving that the
Second Amendment grants an individual right because (1) the Bill of Rights
includes nonpersonal elements and (2) the entirely nonpersonal Twentyseventh Amendment was among the originally proposed amendments
would on its own have some merit.528 However, it ultimately fails because
Madison’s originally proposed placement of the Second Amendment, along
with the other Bill of Rights Amendments guaranteeing individual rights,
into a portion of the Constitution already guaranteeing individual rights,
clearly indicates that he intended an individual right.529 This original
placement combined with its existing envelopment among individual right
guarantees validates its personal nature.
a. Understanding “Right of the People”
The Supreme Court has declared that the term “people” should be
construed identically everywhere in the Constitution.530 This renders
untenable the argument that the Second Amendment protects a
governmental interest unless, for example, the First Amendment is also
interpreted as a collective right over which states have “full authority.”531
The sophisticated collective right model532 is as close as one can come to
rebutting the individual right model’s understanding of “people.” However,
more credible than positing that the individual right guaranteed vanished
with the militia it was meant to ensure, would be the position that the right
to arms remained, and that the “necessary” militia should be brought back

526. See supra note 55.
527. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182 (1939) (“Most if not all of the States have
adopted provisions touching the right to keep and bear arms.”).
528. See supra text accompanying note 328.
529. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Madison’s originally proposed placement
of the Twenty-seventh Amendment also indicates that he did not intend it to be an individual
right. Id.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 202–04. The Ninth Circuit notes that this is the
correct way to interpret “people,” but this only weakens its argument for the validity of the
collective right model. See supra text accompanying note 337.
531. Silveira I cites United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), for the
proposition that “militia” must be construed identically throughout the Constitution, but
Verdugo’s definition of “people” weakens the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the Second
Amendment reserves a state power. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira I), 312 F.3d 1052, 1069–
70, 1070 n.25 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra note 329 and accompanying text. But see supra text
accompanying notes 203–05. Construing “militia” identically everywhere does not weaken
the individual right model given its official and commonly understood meanings. See supra
Part III.A.4.a.
532. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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(perhaps in whatever form sophisticated collective right model adherents
imagine it).533
It is also salient that the Constitution consistently uses the term “right” to
refer to a protected personal interest and “power” to refer to an enumerated
governmental prerogative.534 This usage was equally consistent during the
congressional debates, including the rejected proposal granting states the
power to arm their militias.535 One particularly clear portion of the debates
made the distinction clear: “[T]he constitution is a bill of powers, the great
residuum being the rights of the people.”536 The unique constitutional
reservation of power to the people by the Tenth Amendment is
understandable in as much as the government is one of enumerated powers,
with any remaining powers residing in the governed.537 The Tenth
Amendment’s legislative history also indicates that the phrase “or to the
people” was added onto the end of the Tenth Amendment to assure
Congressman Thomas Tucker that the people were the source of the
government’s power.538
b. Understanding “Bear”
The collective right model’s best argument, but one that ultimately fails
and is irrelevant, is that the phrase “bear arms” has a military connotation
other than the mere carrying of a weapon, and therefore the Second
Amendment refers only to the use of arms in a state-run military context.539
While the phrase can have a military connotation, this is neither its only
nor its primary meaning.540 Silveira I’s use of the 1989 edition of the
Oxford English Dictionary to define the term541 in its originalist analysis is
not only unusual, but misleading. Using a modern dictionary to define a
term as it was used 200 years earlier is suspect in itself. The first definition
of “bear” in Sheridan’s 1789 dictionary is “to carry,” and there is no
definition relating to arms.542 In addition, even if a modern dictionary’s
definition is acceptable, The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the
phrase “bear arms” as “carry firearms” and makes no reference to
soldiering.543 Silveira I’s definition “is correct as far as it goes, but it is
533. The assertion that the militia no longer exists is itself unwarranted. See supra note 73
and accompanying text.
534. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
535. See supra note 68.
536. 1 Annals of Cong. 455 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of June 8, 1789); see
id. at 458 (stating that no state of the union or government should have the power to violate
certain individual rights).
537. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 40; supra note 517.
538. 1 Annals of Cong. at 790 (proceedings of Aug. 18, 1789).
539. See supra text accompanying notes 338–42.
540. See supra note 268.
541. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
542. Sheridan, supra note 454.
543. The New Oxford American Dictionary 142 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds.,
2001).
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also misleading, because the OED says that the ‘main sense’ of ‘bear’ is ‘to
carry.’”544 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and three concurring Justices also
defined “bear” in its usual sense while referring to the Second
Amendment.545
In the final analysis, however, even a military definition of the term is not
inconsistent with the individual right model given the Second Amendment’s
role as a defense against federal tyranny,546 its civic purpose,547 the
definition of “militia,”548 and its accompaniment by the authorization to
“keep” arms.549
c. Understanding “Keep”
The collective right model’s dismissal of “keep” is utterly unreasonable.
To assert that “keep” does not refer to possession550 is inconsistent with
both founding-era and modern definitions. Sheridan’s first two definitions
of “keep” are “to retain” and “to have in custody,” and a later definition is
“to have in the house”;551 New Oxford American’s first definition follows
suit by defining it as “have or retain possession of.”552
Reading “keep and bear” as a “unitary phrase”553 is akin to saying that
we do not know or do not like what this word means, so we will assume it
is equivalent to our already-tortured definition of “bear.”554 First, “keep”
was often used in the Second Amendment context independently of “bear,”
as evidenced by Congressman Scott’s statement.555 Its presentation in the
original Statutes at Large,556 where a margin note refers to the Second
Amendment as the one allowing people to “bear and keep” arms, confirms
that the words were used individually and “keep and bear” is therefore not
a unitary phrase.557

544. Silveira v. Lockyer (Silveira II), 328 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra note
342, at xxxviii–xxix, 20).
545. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
546. See supra Parts I.A.3, III.A.3.
547. See supra text accompanying notes 233–35, 423–41.
548. See supra Parts II.A.3.a, III.A.4.a.
549. U.S. Const. amend II; 1 Stat. 21 (1789); see infra Part III.B.4.c.
550. See supra text accompanying note 346.
551. Sheridan, supra note 454.
552. The New Oxford American Dictionary, supra note 542, at 929.
553. See supra text accompanying note 344.
554. Going on to claim that “keep” does in fact have a separate meaning with reference to
states is likewise indefensible. See supra text accompanying note 345.
555. See supra text accompanying note 62.
556. “The United States Statutes at Large is legal and permanent evidence of all the laws
enacted during a session of Congress.” Nat’l Archives, U.S. Statutes at Large,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/publications/statutes.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2008); see also supra note 1.
557. 1 Stat. 21 (1789).
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It is more reasonable to give “keep” its own meaning, as the Tennessee
Supreme Court did, rather than simply equate it with “bear.”558 Given the
presence of the conjunction “and,” the Amendment should be construed to
secure both a right to “keep” arms and to “bear” arms.
d. Understanding “Arms”
The collective model’s claim that the individual right model ignores
Miller in that it does not adequately define “precisely what type of arms”
are protected559 is false. In accordance with Miller, the individual right
model only claims protection for individual weapons in common use at the
time and suitable for military use.560 However, the protection of weapons
with a military use, with which the collective right model presumably
agrees,561 is not inconsistent with the individual right model.562
CONCLUSION
The individual right model is a better interpretation of the Second
Amendment than the collective right model because it accounts for and
reconciles both halves of the Amendment. The vast array of historical
evidence supporting an individual right, and the absence of evidence to the
contrary, speaks for itself.
The closest one can come to a collective right model is that the founders
intended the tools of violence to be in the hands of individuals, who can
come to the aid of their states if the states are threatened by the federal
government. The founders did not intend the combination of state and
federal governments to have an oligopoly over the tools of violence. While
the Anti-Federalists would have loved to have armed the states as well, in
their bargain they only managed to make explicit what everyone already
knew: that individuals had a preexisting right to be armed. The individual
right model is consistent with the militia orientation of the collective right
model—armed individuals can serve their militias. Under the collective
right model, there remain serious questions as to the wisdom and propriety
of limiting arms-bearing to states.
If the nation as a whole ultimately decides that an individual right is illadvised, it can amend the Constitution. Indeed, the states possess
independent constitutional power to initiate the amendment process and are
not reliant on Congress in this respect.563
The Second Amendment does not read, “The privilege (at government
discretion) of people in service of the state to bear, but not keep, arms

558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.

See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 289–90.
See supra Part II.A.3.g.
See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 546–49.
U.S. Const. art. V; 1 Stat. 19 (1787).
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(except firearms), shall be revocable at will.” Properly understanding “well
regulated Militia” to refer to the armed and ready body of the people, and
considering the founders’ concern with tyranny, the Second Amendment
can be translated into modern parlance: “Armed and ready citizens being
necessary to prevent tyranny, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed.”564

564. This interpretation arose out of a suggestion by David T. Hardy.

